Resetting U.S. Policy Toward Yemen Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 8

Author:	Gregory Johnsen, Near East Studies Scholar, Princeton University

Publisher:	Council on Foreign Relations Press

Release Date: September 2011

4 pages

• DOWNLOAD THE FULL TEXT OF THE MEMORANDUM HERE (105K PDF)

Yemen is slipping into an uncertain and dangerous future. In early June 2011, President Ali Abdullah Salih, who has ruled the country for the past thirty-three years, narrowly escaped an assassination attempt. The next day he flew to Saudi Arabia for emergency medical treatment, where he remained for three months before a dramatic and unannounced return to Sanaa last week. During his absence, Salih’s eldest son, Ahmed, and a quartet of nephews moved into the presidential palace, threatening open war if there is a move toward a political transition. Lined up against Salih and his heirs is a creaky alliance of former foes and defected generals who agree on only one single point: Salih can longer be president.

Nearly half of the regular army is in rebellion under the command of Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar, a general from Salih’s own tribe. But this is much more than a two-sided fight between old comrades-in-arms. Various militia groups have taken advantage of the fracturing of state authority to further their own sectarian agendas. In the north, near the border with Saudi Arabia, the Huthis have solidified their control over large swaths of territory. In the southern governorates of Abyan and Shabwa, fighters linked to al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) have made a frightening surge, overrunning towns and military bases. Neither military faction is willing to openly and forcefully confront the militants for fear of weakening themselves ahead of a potential civil war.

In this murky mixture of competing interests, U.S. policy is adrift. Aware of the danger AQAP poses to the United States, the Obama administration has dramatically increased air and drone strikes in Yemen. At best, this is a delaying tactic designed to keep AQAP off-balance until the Yemeni military can act. Airpower alone is not enough to defeat AQAP. Indeed, AQAP may actually grow stronger as a result of strikes. Even more worrisome, this is al-Qaeda’s second incarnation in the country. The gains of 2002 and 2003 have been forfeited by years of neglect when U.S. policy bounced from one crisis to the next without an overarching structure. What is needed now for Yemen is a strategic reset that has three goals: initiating a decisive political transition at the top, attacking the roots of AQAP’s support in Yemen, and mobilizing the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) to energize Yemen’s failing economy.

The Challenge in Yemen

For the past three decades President Salih has ruled Yemen by playing different opposition groups against one another. This autocratic, patronage style of governing in which Salih’s allies were rewarded and his opponents harassed alienated large portions of the population. By 2004, it had helped spark a tribal revolt in the north. Endemic corruption and poor governance also contributed to the rise of a secessionist movement in the south three years later, further undermining Yemen’s perpetually weak economy.

Although cognizant of these problems, the United States has been primarily concerned with the threat posed by AQAP—the armed threat that least worries Salih and the Yemeni government. Washington has relied heavily on air and drone strikes, which limit the immediate danger to U.S. service personnel and can be executed more cheaply than traditional military means. But such an approach has significant drawbacks: errant missiles and civilian casualties have helped radicalize a new generation of fighters and convinced many that Yemen—like Iraq and Afghanistan—is now a legitimate theater of jihad.

Elements of a Broader Strategy

Given the messy and deep-seated problems in Yemen, the United States must be realistic about what it can accomplish. With limited resources and an even more limited public appetite for additional foreign policy burdens at this time, the United States has to leverage the power and influence of regional actors, principally Saudi Arabia and the GCC. Although relations with the kingdom have grown increasingly contentious since the onset of the Arab Awakening, there is room for cooperation on Yemen. Much like the United States’ relationship with Mexico, Saudi Arabia views its neighbor to the south as a source of instability and potential problems for years to come. As great as the threat of an unstable Yemen is for the United States, it is even greater for Saudi Arabia.

The kingdom is still willing to hedge its bets, but there is a growing realization within Riyadh that despite Salih’s return he will never be able to reunite the country. The longer Salih remains president, the worse the situation in Yemen will become. Both the United States and Saudi Arabia broadly agree on the main problems: the lack of a political transition, the danger of AQAP, and the simmering threat of Yemen’s fragile economy. Neither country can solve the challenge of Yemen unilaterally, but together they can help arrest the country’s downward descent.

Political Transition

It is impossible for Yemen to move forward as long as Salih’s sons and nephews are in a position to scuttle deals that they view as unfavorable. The United States must work with its partners in the Gulf to remove this roadblock to a political transition. Last year, the United States earmarked $75 million to assist Yemen’s counterterrorism forces in the Ministry of the Interior and gave millions more to other units, including those under the command of Salih’s eldest son. The United States should, in conjunction with the GCC, inform Ahmed and his cousins that this money as well as GCC funding will be cut off and targeted UN sanctions will be applied if they do not step aside and agree to a military reshuffle and a transition council. This warning should be delivered in three stages. First, the United States, in conjunction with Saudi Arabia, should convey a private message that offers a face-saving exit but assures Salih’s immediate relatives that punitive measures will be taken if they do not step aside. If this fails, the warning should then be delivered publicly. Finally, if they still refuse to step down, the money should be cut and sanctions implemented. Ahmad and his cousins are highly dependent on money to buy the continued loyalty of their troops. Without it, many in the Republican Guards will join the anti-Salih coalition.

In the event that a coordinated approach of cutting off the money and sanctions does not work, the United States should pursue a policy of forced isolation. To be successful, the United States would need to peel off Salih’s important remaining domestic allies—such as parliamentarians, ministers, and tribal sheikhs—through a process of pressure and enticements until Salih and his immediate family are completely isolated.

Attacking AQAP’s Roots

An al-Qaeda franchise has never been defeated by force alone. The only time an affiliate has been successfully dismantled was in Saudi Arabia, from 2003 to 2006, when the population turned on the terrorist group. To replicate that success in Yemen, the United States needs to partner with the governments of both Yemen and Saudi Arabia to counter AQAP’s propaganda. Washington and Riyadh must attempt to spark a public debate about AQAP and its methods, drawing public attention to the fact that the group kills civilians and consistently violates Islamic norms. Riyadh’s experience using soft power to undermine al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia and Yemeni officials’ knowledge of the local scene will be vital in ensuring that militants are not replaced as quickly as they are killed. For its part, the United States should contribute a small team of Arabic-speaking diplomats with experience in Yemen.

Together with their Saudi and Yemeni colleagues, U.S. policymakers should establish a joint center for public awareness. The center would seek to deprive AQAP of one of its main assets: unchallenged public assertions. At the moment, no entity in Yemen is speaking up in Arabic against AQAP, which means that the organization is able to shape its public message uncontested. The joint center would work to make al-Qaeda as synonymous with terrorism in Yemen as it is in the United States.

Special Fund

The United States should also partner with the GCC to establish a special fund to help stabilize Yemen’s economy and provide humanitarian assistance in the aftermath of Salih’s departure. The initial capital for the fund, which is contingent on Salih’s leaving office, should come from the more than $2 billion GCC countries pledged at the 2006 London conference but have yet to deliver due to concerns about corruption. The fund should be chaired by the director of the Arab Fund, with all donor countries and institutions represented on the board. This would do much to eliminate donor competition and coordination failures, which have often hampered efforts in the past. Once the economy is stabilized, the focus of the fund should shift to longer-term investment designed to create jobs and technical training.

None of these recommendations will miraculously turn Yemen into a model democracy overnight, but together they will arrest the country’s rapid downward descent and deny AQAP and other militants the opportunity to exploit the turmoil in ways that threaten U.S. security and interests in the region. However, as Yemen slips further into chaos, the opportunity to implement these measures is fast diminishing.

The Author

Gregory D. Johnsen is a former Fulbright fellow in Yemen and currently a PhD candidate in Near Eastern studies at Princeton University. He blogs atwww.bigthink.com/blogs/waq-al-waq.

CFR.org - U.S.-Pakistan Intel Ties in Trouble

CFR.org - U.S.-Pakistan Intel Ties in Trouble

U.S Gets Tough on Pakistan, is Chairman Mullen's Remarks the Beginning?

Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Mike Mullen testified before Congress (PDF) on September 22 that the Haqqani network, the militant group blamed for the September 13 attack on the U.S. embassy in Kabul, is a "strategic arm" of Pakistan's top spy agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). U.S. allegations of links between the ISI and extremist groups are hardly new (ForeignPolicy). But the latest remarks constitute a firm ultimatum that the United States will act unilaterally if Pakistan doesn't crack down on extremist groups and official ties to those groups, says CFR's South Asia expert Daniel Markey. Mullen's remarks prompted outrage from Pakistani officials (WSJ) who deny such links. Markey warns that unless the United States can make this latest threat to Pakistan credible, Pakistan will not change the status quo. He recommends Washington be clear with the Pakistanis on the steps the United States is willing to take to destroy the Haqqani network, if Pakistan fails to do so.

Are Admiral Mullen's remarks a prelude to more unilateral U.S. action inside Pakistan, such as cross-border raids and an increase in drone strikes?

That's precisely the argument being made that this is an ultimatum, that the United States is done listening to Pakistan's excuses about why it will not act in North Waziristan [Pakistan's tribal areas, where the Haqqani network leadership is suspected to be]. The United States doesn't accept the Pakistani arguments that they're not responsible for the Haqqani network's activities inside of Afghanistan, [and is telling Pakistan] that the U.S. will take action into its own hands if it doesn't see Pakistan change course. This is a clearer ultimatum than any we have ever heard.

We've had some versions of such ultimatums in the past. Is the United States more willing to act against Pakistan now than before?

This is a more credible threat: It is more public and clear in terms of not just suggesting that Pakistan should go after the Haqqani network, but that Pakistan is partially responsible for the behavior and success of the Haqqani network, and the United States won't stand for it.

It's also a more credible threat because it's been made before Congress. Congress controls the purse and is inclined not to allow military assistance to Pakistan to continue unless Pakistan takes efforts against the Haqqani network.

In its ultimatum, there is an implied threat that if Pakistan doesn't take steps against the Haqqani network, the United States will.

The fact that the United States took the action that it did against Osama bin Laden[in the May 2 SEALs attack on his Pakistan compound] also demonstrates a certain credibility to act inside of Pakistan. And the fact that U.S. has continued drone strikes in the aftermath of that attack, in spite of some fairly public Pakistani government criticism, also suggests the United States is serious this time around.

The United States is also more likely to be serious now than at other points because right now the level of U.S. military force in Afghanistan is the highest it's likely to be. If U.S. is ever going to take such actions, now is the most likely time.

Some think that the Pakistani security establishment's links to groups like the Haqqani network are a hedge against an Afghan reconciliation process that may not work in their favor. If the United States gives Pakistan a seat at the negotiating table in the peace talks with insurgent groups--something Islamabad has been asking for--will the Pakistani calculus change?

You're sketching out a hypothetical where you suggest that Pakistan would have a seat at the table. But what does that in fact mean if Pakistan's favored political allies--the Haqqani network and the Afghan Taliban leadership that's based inside of Pakistan--are excluded from the process? What influence, then, would Pakistan have over the peace process? From the Pakistani perspective, having a seat at the table means putting their favorite Afghan proxies into positions of power in a post-NATO Afghanistan.

But is any reconciliation process in Afghanistan even possible without influential groups like the Haqqani network?

From a Pakistani point of view, it's very clear to them that this doesn't end with Haqqani, which is part of the reason for their reluctance.

A lot of it depends on what you mean by "reconciliation process." If the question is whether certain elements of the current insurgents can be brought into a bigger tent of the Afghan government, then yes, it's possible. You're right, and others are right to be skeptical. It looks like it's more difficult than anybody might have thought.

I'm increasingly inclined to believe that the U.S. government doesn't see the Haqqani network as welcome in that bigger tent in Afghanistan because they've been too aligned with al-Qaeda, they're too directly blood-stained in their efforts to fight against the United States, and they look too much like international terrorists to be included. So reconciliation at some level looks like some sort of political accommodation at the end of a war, but precisely who's sitting at the table is not yet clear.

Since 2011, the United States has offered billions of dollars in military aid to Pakistan in return for counterterrorism cooperation. And it is also one of the leverages the United States applies, as reflected by the recent decision to withhold $800 million in military assistance (Reuters). If Pakistan refuses U.S. aid and stops cooperating with the United States, could it ally more closely with Iran and China, undermining U.S. interests in the region?

Pakistan has been pretty clear, and this is certainly true after the bin Laden raid, that they see China as their closest international partner. They reached out to China to fill in whatever gaps, in terms of military or other assistance, might be left should the U.S. relationship break down. My sense, though, is that China is reluctant to fill those gaps. China doesn't make a practice of providing the scale or type of assistance that the United States has provided; China isn't in a position to provide some of the higher technology that the United States has provided. It therefore is only a partial means to fill that gap that the United States would leave behind.

Iran is even more inadequate, incapable of helping Pakistan in some very important ways. Of course, this would be a direction that the United States would think is troubling, should Pakistan slide into Iran's camp, or firm up its relationship with China at our expense. But the current situation is also not good from a U.S. perspective. So the hope is that by placing pressure on Pakistan now, Pakistan will make an about-face rather than find itself in camp with the Irans of the world. Pakistan doesn't want to be a rogue state.

What should the United States do in the short term when it comes to dealing with Pakistan?

The problem is within the Pakistani security establishment, that they continue to believe that arming and working--actively and passively--with various militant groups serves their purposes.

In the near term, the United States has essentially leveled a threat against Pakistan. In its ultimatum, there is an implied threat that if Pakistan doesn't take steps against the Haqqani network, the United States will. Unless the United States can make that threat credible no matter what Pakistan does to escalate what could be a looming conflict or crisis, Pakistan is likely to stand its ground. So to make this ultimatum succeed where others have failed, the United States needs to be clear and transparent about the steps it is willing to take.

The clarity has to be there, otherwise the Pakistanis will assume that they can ride this out. For its part, Washington will become increasingly frustrated and the relationship would likely bottom out anyway, because it will be very difficult for the United States to continue to provide assistance to a Pakistan that does not take action against the Haqqani network. So I see a downward trajectory in the relationship. In that context, clarity about the steps the United States is likely to take is important for Pakistan to understand, if only so that that threat will be more credible.

I would like to see the credible threat provoke a shift on Pakistan's part. If we can see that, then we can begin to really turn the tide in this relationship. It worries me about going too far in shutting down opportunities for assistance to Pakistan. [Aid] suspensions are smart, conditionality--if narrowly targeted--makes sense. But if you turn off assistance and you don't maintain the prospect that you might turn it back on again--if you begin to put into place a whole array of obstacles to future engagement--then the Pakistanis will have even less reason to believe that some brighter future is possible for them.

Is this U.S. ultimatum confined to the U.S. taking action against the Haqqani network, or does it translate to other Pakistan-based militant groups like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)o r Quetta Shura Taliban?

From a Pakistani point of view, it's very clear to them that this doesn't end with Haqqani, which is part of the reason for their reluctance. Pakistanis ask me, "Look if we cede ground on one group, you'll be coming at us again on another." Where does this end? And why does the United States, from their perspective, get to define who the threats are? So it makes them skeptical about what we're actually up to.

The problem is within the Pakistani security establishment, that they continue to believe that arming and working--actively and passively--with various militant groups serves their purposes. And they continue not to believe that these groups are necessarily dangerous to Pakistan or counterproductive to regional security.

Until that sort of soul searching takes place within the Pakistani military and the ISI, you're not likely to see an end to these U.S. demands, and a real shift in terms of the relationship. That is the most significant shift that has to take place.

Weigh in on this issue by emailing securitydiscussion@gmail.com.

ASSESSING AND RECOMMENDING QUANTITATIVE RESEARCH DESIGNS

According to Creswell (2009), research studies are based on a statement that is predictably testable. For instance, Nonprofits and civic engagement (Berry, 2005), is a study, which examined the potentials for nonprofit agencies to fully engage their clients through public policy. Accordingly, it was conducted on the premise that section 501(C3s) discourages public policy participation considerably, thereby reducing their likelihood of building, fostering, and enhancing civic engagement within the United States. This statement was partly tested in a study done on the American nonprofit sector, known as ‘strengthening nonprofit advocacy project (Berry & Arons, 2003)’. Because the outcome of the study was tested in part within an array of institutions (Lincoln Filene Center, Charity Lobbying in the Public Interest, and OMB Watch), not only strengthened the findings of the study, but solidified its credibility (Berry, 2005, p. 572).

Moreover, the means through which data were generated in the study (i.e., random-sample mail survey nationally, phone interviews of some nonprofit executive directors among the survey participants, board members and directors of selected nonprofits, and others), also solidified the study (p. 573). Nonetheless, since the main data discussed in the study were the ones primarily taken from the mail survey of some 220,000 (501(C3s), exclusively, and coupled with the limited use of outline of the sampling frame and others, weakened the credibility of the final result. Moreover, the use of a small portion of a very large sample of nonprofits, may not accurately support the assumption, that 501(C (3) is a deterrent to nonprofit advocacy (p. 570). In order to sustain the validity of a study, the underlining assumption or hypothesis must be empirically relevant and connected to a number of phenomena out there. This can be achieved through the theoretical concepts within practical settings (Reynolds, 2007, p. 52).

According to Creswell (2009), the standard practice of all research paradigms, is to maximize the reliability and validity of the study.  Also, the deduction that if nonprofits are discouraged from advocacy, they are equally dissuaded from recruiting lower-income and other less privileged Americans to interact politically, could be unrelated.  And the H provision used by the Internal Revenue Service to measure the expenditure of a two scale lobbying by legislatures and grass rooters, is not only in stark contrast to the normative theory used in the study, most nonprofit agencies are not even aware of it being an available option (p. 574). The use of H electors as control group, owing to their similarities to 501 (3Cs) even though they are not true control groups, seriously limited the validity of the findings.

Berry (2005) and Weitzman, Silver, and Brazil (2006) shared some similarities, in that like the former, the latter is a study that examined ways of improving public policy through data management.  Weitzman et al (2006) was conducted against the assumption that the improvement of data practice as a tool to enhance public policy is tied to two distinct schools of thoughts held by rational choice theorists and deliberative democratic theorists. The researchers based the need for this study on the claim that better information may lead to a comprehensively analytical decision making, while increased access to data encourages greater democratic governance. Hence, better information may lead to a comprehensively analytical decision making, while increased access to data encourages greater democratic governance (p.390). Bardach (2000) argued that through rational choice theory, political agents trying to identify or evaluate problems have an array of alternatives to make the right choice.    

The quasi experiment design used in this study was taken from an Urban Health Initiative (UHI), conducted nationally for the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. The UHI is intended to improve the health and safety of kids. A key quasi independent variable in the UHI study is that the process of handling children’s health and safety issues is characterized by good data practice.  Accordingly, it is not possible to obtain an effective data driven process that fully support the hypothesis.

One limitation of the Weitzman et al. (2006) is the problem posed by technology. Most public and nonprofit agencies lack the full capacity to effectively manage microdata. Moreover, by selecting only fifteen cities among thousands of cities around the United States, was not disclosed in the study. However, applying the findings of few localities as valid public policy practice nationally, questions the validity of the study. Even though the study did not comment on the problems posed by the Freedom of Information Act on studies of this sort, through the use of the rational choice theory, research has shown that, policy makers are denied full access to certain data, thus leaving public policy decisions to be made incrementally (Reidy, 2003). As in Berry (2005), the experiment used to test the variables, were manipulated in Weitzman et al. (2006) in that it was based on the findings of a prior longitudinal study of an earlier related study.

A primary reason why the causal comparative design will be used in my proposed study, using soft power as an effective counterterrorism tool, is on the basis that one does not have to impose any form of treatment for the study participants (Creswell, 2009). Accordingly, in causal comparative designs, which are conducted after the fact, the primary focus of the study is to look for the relationships between cause and effect of various groups. For instance, the study might look into how familial support of new members, for instance Al-Qaeda, affects their ability to undertake suicide missions.

Even though quantitative studies heavily rely on experimental designs involving random participants assigned to treatment or control group, the fact that my study will not run a standardize test to measure or compare the outcomes of the study, nullifies its use, Creswell (2009, p. 134). And since the subjects of the study will not be randomly assigned to survey groups due to impracticality, invalidates the use of quasi-experimental designs.

To assess the validity of the study, data will be assigned numeric values with a set of coding scheme. Based on the research question (would the replacement of the disproportionate use of force with soft power, as a counterterrorism measure eliminates the level of anger that gives rise to terrorism?), one or more statistical inferences will be used (p. 135). Hence, the data generated through that process will be carefully analyzed, and stored as descriptive statistical data (i.e., measuring of fundamental variable, corroboration, graphics, etc). For this study, a regression analysis will be used. The aim is to establish a statistical model that best explains the relationship of the variables (such as what affects one, affects all).

References

American Psychological Association. (2010). Publication manual of the American Psychological Association (6th ed.). Washington, DC: Author.

Bardach, E. (2000). A practical guide for policy analysis: The eightfold path to more effective problem solving. New York, NY.

Berry, J. M. (2005, Sept/October). Nonprofits and civic engagement. Public Administration Review, 65, 568-578.

Creswell, J. W. (2009). Research design: Qualitative, quantitative, and mixed methods approach (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.

Reidy, M. (2003). Key themes: Reflections from the child indicator project. Working paper, University of Chicago, Chapin Hall Center for Children.

Reynolds, P. D. (2007). A premier in theory construction. Boston, MA.

Weitzman, B., Silver, D., & Brazil, C. (2006, May). Efforts to improve public policy and programs through data practice: Experiences in 15 distressed American cities. Public Administration Review, 66, 386–399.

THEORIES AND THEORISTS

In a research, theory describes the boundaries to how the objects of a study are determined, and provides the lenses with which subject matters are filtered to clarify complex issues (Creswell, 2009, p. 51).  Accordingly, it further provides those systematize perceptions on which research ideas are set, serves as guide to academic interpretations, and moreover, in criminal justice, it is inevitably the means of establishing policies in crime, practice, and decision making. Essentially, in criminal justice, theory is ideally centered on crime and crime rates (Kraska, 2006). The theory of punishment and the broken window theory, have characterized the criminal justice field for the last half a century. The theory of punishment is both retributive and utilitarian and a part of Rawls’ work on social justice (Robinson, 2010). 

 

Accordingly, the theory of social justice is based on the pretext that if democratic societies treat citizens fairly and equally, then what issues are central and ideal to them? The question is based on the assumption that democratic systems strive to treat all citizens fairly, and as social equals—against the backdrop of justice (Rawls, 2003, p. 79). Social Scientists James Q. Wilson and George L. Kelling introduced the Broken Window Theory in an article published in the Atlantic Monthly back in March, 1982. The argument in the broken window theory is that, leaving the broken windows to an unoccupied building unrepaired has the tendency of inviting hooligans to break additional windows. 

Sooner or later, those same vandals may try to break into the property. And once nothing is done, they will eventually attempt to squat on the property, if it continues to remain vacant. Wilson and Kelling (1982) argued subsequently that the broken window theory may be applied to a number of real life situations. Take an unattained sidewalk for instance. If trash is not immediately picked up on littering, it eventually adds up, and soon people will start leaving bags of trash from restaurants like McDonald that offer drive-through option.

The rationale for the theory, the authors stated, is that a good way to prevent crime, is to address them immediately and not when it gets out of hand. Take care of a problem earlier than later. A fixes for the theory of broken window, is the, Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in Our Communities by Kelling and Coles (1996), in which it is argued at length that to prevent deviant social behaviors and crime in societies, immediately address those issues that give rise to the social problems. 

In criminal justice, there is a close link between crime prevention and punishment. According to Kraska (2006, p. 168), theories in criminal justice are mostly used to find ways in solving crimes. Thus, like the broken window theory, the punishment theory is also meant to prevent crime. The use of punishment to prevent crime is further reinforced in the Stanford Encyclopedia, that those laws, which prescribe punishment for the commission of crime, are designed in ways that prevent future criminal behaviors. As a result, the crime prevention is precise and broad. In order to prevent others from committing crimes, the options must be broad based. In precise terms, punishment serves as clear indication that those who commit crimes will be punished. 

Consequently, the preciseness of punishment prevents offenders from recommitting crimes. Additionally, Creswell (2009, p. 69) also alluded that theory may be broad or narrow in scope—at the broad level, punishment is retributive. It goes to justify that people are punished because they deserve to be punished for their crimes, and to restitute the harm done to society (Davis, 1992). 

The theories of punishment and broken windows are quite important to our American justice system, how crime is prevented and solved, and moreover, they resonate with the American democratic governance. 

Besides, a number of scholarly debates in the social sciences in general, that seeking to understand the why of crime control, and the entire gamut of criminal justice, is not only academically demanding, it is quite fascinating, and rewarding than the factors that influence crime (as cited in Kraska, 2006, p. 171). Nonetheless, seeking to investigate the essence of these theories as they relate to criminal justice is extremely important to the development and realization of policy reforms (Crank, 2003). 

Since punishment and crime prevention are important elements in criminal justice, they therefore serve as the theoretical lenses that guide my effort to investigate the factors influencing the rise in terrorism. Central in my research, are the issues of justice and fairness as constituted in the theory of punishment. One question that my research will attempt to answer is whether or not the recent rise in terrorism activities, especially since September 11, 2001, is due to the severe punishment meted against terrorists by the US and its allies to combat the spread of terrorism globally? 

The question also exists whether the fight against global terrorism is an unjust one, especially with how information is extracted from those branded as terrorist suspects? How consistent is this fight to end terrorism with Rawls’ expectations of democratic societies, that they are guided by rules and procedures, and moreover, just? This expectation as speculated in his theory of punishment is meant to shape the supporting notion of justice and detailing the fairness, reasonable and rational manner that all men should be treated (Rawls, 2003, p. 7). In addition to Rawls theories of social justice and punishment, are the classical thoughts of John Stuart Mill’s theory of utilitarianism, Cesare Beccaria, Jeremy Bentham, rationale choice theory and finally, the deterrence theory.                   

Reference

Bedau, Hugo Adam and Kelly, Erin, "Punishment", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.). Available here http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2010/entries/punishment/.

 

Crank, J. P. (2003). Imagining Justice. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson.

Creswell, J. W. (2009). Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches (3rd Ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Davis, M. (1992). To Make the Punishment Fit the Crime: Essays in the Theory of Criminal Justice, Boulder, CO: Westview, pp. 42–68.

Kelling, G., & Coles, C. (1996). Fixing Broken Windows: Restoring Order and Reducing Crime in Our Communities. Touchstone, New York, NY.

Rawls, J. (2003). Justice as fairness: A restatement (2^nd ed.). Boston, MA: Belknap Press. 

Robinson, M. (2010). Assessing criminal justice practice using social justice theory. Social Justice Res, 23(1), 77-97.

Wilson, J. Q., & Kelling, G. L. (1982). Broken windows: The police and neighborhood safety. Atlantic, NJ. Available at http://www.manhattan-institute.org/pdf/_atlantic_monthly-broken_windows.pdf.

COMBATTING THE SOURCES OF TERRORIST FINANCING: AN IMPORTANT PART IN ADDRESSING TERRORISM

Research Question:  will the combating of alternative terrorism funding sources eliminate the spread of global terrorism? Objective: This research is to determine whether randomized place-based trials will likely uncover financial sources that support terrorism. Design, Setting, and Participants: Analysis of efforts to prosecute charitable organizations that support terrorism, the 9/11 Commission Reports. Ethics- United States v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief & Development Less than three months after the attacks of September 11, 2001; transcripts from the Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC), under authority of Executive Orders 12,947 and 13,224, designated the Holy Land Foundation supports Hamas. Main outcome of the research: Using case study approach, those factors that facilitate the development and implementation of randomized trials are identified with particular focus on specific problems and/or advantages of place-based experiments. Therefore going after charitable organizations and other sources that support terrorism will potentially weaken and subsequently reduce the number of attacks launched by terrorist organizations.

Abstract (Summary): Financing plays a central role in how terrorists carry out their plots. If this is true, targeting the means which terrorist organizations use to successfully accomplish their mission will drastically reduce if not eliminate terrorism. Before the advent of the September 11, 2001 attack of the New York’s World Trade Center and the Pentagon, law enforcement agencies and policy makers paid no attention to the sources that fund and sustain global terrorism.  Though the passing of the USA Patriot Act was intended to address other issues that pertain to US national security, it was also important in the efforts to combat the financial sources through which terrorist organizations support their ambitions, and including money laundering. Among others, the Patriot Act had “extra-territorial” effect on banks outside of the United States. This paper will look at various sources used by terrorist organizations and sympathizers alike to finance the act globally. This paper will mostly focus on those best practices that the US federal agencies and their international partners have use to uncover financial sources that support terrorism and the repercussion those discoveries had on the terrorist organizations.

Introduction

Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, along with subsequent similar attacks exposed some weaknesses in the law enforcement structure and created the need among US policy makers to strengthen the overall response mechanisms of the national security apparatus of the US, Emerson (2002).  No one will argue that the security situation nationally has changed or improved since the September 11, 2001 attacks.  Neighborhoods, ports of entry, public facilities, etc have been equipped with crisis preparedness mechanisms sponsored with tax payers’ dollars. Studies have shown that both security and emergency preparedness capabilities have dramatically improved even though there are still some loopholes. 

These same studies identified weaknesses and strengths of local and federal law enforcement agencies; nonetheless, very few evaluations have been undertaken nationally using the law enforcement community as the unit of analysis, www.hhs.gov/budget/04budget/fy2004bib.pdf (16 March2004). Also according to the (Washington: GAO, April 2002) community-based analysis is significant in that groundwork preparation for terrorist attacks brings together many organizations within the community, i.e. law enforcement, health-care units, transportation, media entities.  Besides, using a more qualitative approach allows for the capture of market and policy factors that can affect emergency response preparedness for crises response entities, and including law enforcement agencies within a dozen nationally representative metropolitan areas since the 9/11 attacks  (Washington: GAO, April, 2002).  

In my opinion, since law enforcement gained more attention and support since 9/11, this is an important point in time for local communities along with policy makers to reflect on terrorism and other emergency preparedness situations.   In addition, this paper will discuss changes in tactics and funding for law enforcement agencies in the first few years following the 9/11 attacks. The paper will also look at progresses made so far in disabling the financial support bases of terrorism and their abilities to launch future strikes on American targets within the US and abroad.  The paper will closely look at few stimulating reports that demonstrate high level of success, focusing mainly on the issues that tend to paralyze terrorist network. Those challenges that lay along the way in getting this done in conjunction with the policy implications of the findings will also be discussed.


Research Methodology


The finding of this paper is based on the analysis on data collected based on studies conducted by the Community Tracking Study (CTS) sites visits looked at a dozen metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) two of those studies used randomized place-based trials in evaluating hot spots that can yield successful results. In those studies, the first finding is that using place-based randomized trials to evaluate hot spots a successful policing strategy in tackling crime. This conclusive statement of the studies is made against the backdrop of two randomized experiments conducted in two separate hot spots policing interventions in metropolitan Minneapolis and New Jersey City Drug Market Analysis. Using case study approach, those factors that facilitate the development and implementation of randomized trials are identified with particular focus on specific problems and/or advantages of place-based experiments.

Although this paper did not delve into the specifics of how federal agents uncover terrorist plots, it mostly looked at or at least commented on the success of place-based randomized trials of evaluating terrorist hot spots undertaken by law enforcement agencies. Attention will be drawn also to the reason why the successful example of experiments in hot spots policing has not inspired similar place-based experimentation in other areas of the criminal field or policing. There are other lessons on the implementation and development of place-based randomized experimental methods that are generally identified but did not play much role in this research. 

This paper hopes to explain in detail the use and importance of randomized policy experiments in that it produces more valid answers to most policy questions than other research methods that lack random testing. For instance, Feeder & Boruch (2000) wrote that there is little or no room for disagreement that experiment in general provides exceptional method to assess the exactness of a given intervention. Weisburd (2004) noted that experiments remain the idiosyncratic method rather than a way of life in the field of policy research. In his advocacy that policy be scientifically researched just as in medicine before put to the test, Jonathan Shepherd further said that “policing tactics, teaching techniques and sentencing would benefit from a the same kind of rigorous assessment, but are rarely subject to scientific analysis, he told (The Times July, 2009). Shepherd makes the observation because according to him “efforts to document the failure rates of those US and British criminal justice funding institutions that choose to support other research initiatives in treatment evaluation other than randomized experiments revealed a high failure rate”.

While there are many other methods of conducting research in the criminal justice field, the number of people attracted to randomized research is outstanding though the number of randomized experiments accounted for so far is still relatively low compared to areas like medical research observed Petrosino (2000) . In the same research conducted by Petrosino (2000), over three hundred randomized studies that are relevant to criminal justice problems were documented.  Weisburd (2004) concluded that it is no longer relevant to further the argument that randomized experiments cannot be carried out in criminal justice. The question that remains to be answered is: what then seem to be the problem that criminal justice experiments have not yet move into the mainstream of criminal justice evaluations?


Law Enforcement Readiness since 9/11


Up until the 9/11 World Trade Center attack, United States policy makers and federal law enforcement agencies paid little or no attention to how terrorist organizations fund their missions, Bedi (2004).  Research shows that though the USA Patriot Act was initially passed to deal with other national security concerns of the United States, this piece of legislation now serves as a vital tool to pursue money laundering activities, and those financial sources that support terrorism efforts, El-Sheik (2005 According to Robinson (2006), one key importance of the Patriot Act is its “extra-territorial” influence on financial institutions outside the United States.  ).  Based on the methodology adopted for this research, sources and means through which terrorists fund their operations would be interchangeably referred to as hotspots.

After seeing the role that financing played in global terrorism policymakers came to recognize the need to focus their attention on the financial sources that terrorist organizations use to finance their operations. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, policymakers also realized that in order to effectively combat this aspect of terrorism, policymakers need to better understand the variety of financial mechanisms that terrorists employ to fund their organizations.

The 9/11 Commission Report also reveals that legitimate financial institutions are manipulated by terrorist organizations to execute legal transactions on their behalf in the form of profits generated from doing business legally, and charity donations. Other sources of financing also come from illicit activities such as drug trafficking. Since doing business formally with most international financial systems is the perfect legal way to go, terrorist organizations before 9/11 manipulated these financial systems by executing legal transactions to fund illegal activities, Burton (2006).

The prevalence of Internet and offshore banking presents additional barriers to law enforcement and intelligence authorities in their attempts to monitor global finances.  Internet banking enables terrorists to transfer funds quickly and virtually anonymously and, due to its extensive use by the general public and the surplus of transactions that occur each day, tracking these is a major logistical challenge.  According to Bedi (2004), there is no institution to regulate the Internet and few national (and no international) laws guiding its use, so states have modest resources to scrutinize Internet banking.  Burton (2006) argues that offshore banks present a hurdle to law enforcement agencies because of bank secrecy laws that exist in places such as exotic vacation spots like the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands.  Bank accounts are protected and can remain so unless one presents overwhelming evidence that they are connected to illegal activities, which is oftentimes extremely difficult to obtain, Robinson (2006). The burden of proof lies with law enforcement agencies because national banking laws do not easily transfer from one state to another and actions that are deemed illegal by the United States may not be considered so overseas.

Funding of Terrorism

After the first World Trade Center bombing in February 1993, Mohammed Salameh, the first apprehended suspect was denied a 5 million-dollar bond by the judge presiding over the case even though this “poor, unemployed illegal immigrant” came up with the money, Ehrenfeld (2002).  But just as the case with Salameh, the eight men who were apprehended after him for their alleged intention to blow up the Manhattan Tunnel, along with bridges and possibly assassinate some public officials were also able to put forth bonds to secure their bails, Robinson (2006).  Firstly, no one questioned the moral justification or reasons why those organizations or sources that provided the funds to secure the release of these nine men, and including Salameh.  And moreover, the question on the significance of funding to terrorism became mainly an issue in the wake of the 9/11 attacks (911 Commission Report, July 2004).

But almost certainly, civil liberty institutions soon began questioning Federal Government’s move of clamping down on those “charitable organizations” and sympathizing partners suspected to be behind a number of the financial transfers made to terrorist organizations worldwide, Nichols (2008).  In addition, Ehrenfeld (2002) claims that funds generated from the illegal drug sale of opium and cocaine largely fuel terrorist activities globally. Besides, research has shown that the illegal trade of narcotic constitutes the main source of funding that supports terrorism, Blank (2001).  By this time, Federal law enforcement agencies and their international partners have a mindset as to who their targets were.  

President Bush’s statement that “money is the life-blood of terrorist operations – and today we are asking the world to stop payment” makes it apparent that his administration was preparing to go after those institutions that support terrorism, Emerson (2002).  In addition, his administration’s full court press engagement to freeze, seize, confiscate, and perhaps stagnate the flow of funds to terrorist without putting together a formidable action  plan and intelligence on how to address the situation, and this only tells how desperate the administration was,  Washington Post (December, 2001).  The moral dilemma faced by federal law enforcement agents going after charitable and other institutions which provide financial support to terrorist organizations is the difficulty in balancing the inherent freedom enjoyed by Americans versus weeding out the bad people for the common good of all.

Going after Terrorist Hotspots is a Costly Venture

Because of the level of accuracy and coordination with which the terrorists carried out the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration had put the “war on terror” on the top of its agenda mainly due to political pressure from the American people, Britain, and to some extent, the UN (The Economist, October 22, 2005).  The result of this is that it created a situation where in those tasked with the responsibilities of managing financial assets such as accountants, solicitors, investment bankers, etc have joined the  law enforcement community to haunt down terrorists wherever they exist.  Emerson (2002) stated that the private sector bears the major burden of the effort to choke off funding for terrorists, and hence banks and other financial institutions are scanning their customer accounts more carefully for signs of suspicious people and transactions. Graham Dillon, a top Executive of KPMG a consulting firm based in London, claimed that Millions of prospective and current bank customers are hampered by tougher compliance standards, and that anti-money-laundering technology is focused on identifying suspicious transactions that bear little resemblance to those typically used by terrorists. He contends that current technology could be reconfigured to check for things that better fit the profile of terrorist financing.

The total cost of complying with anti-terror financing regulations is difficult to determine partly because many institutions (private and governmental) tackle the issue in tandem with money laundering, a separate financial crime. The British Bankers' Association (BBA) estimates that banks in Britain spend about £250 million each year to comply with regulations on the two sorts of crime. According to a global study of about 200 banks last year by KPMG, those interviewed increased investments on anti-money-laundering activities by an average of 61% in the prior three years. Just how difficult the fight to pursue so called charitable organizations and others who provide financial supports to fund terrorist activities globally, and which is the main focus of this research?

Ratcliffe (2004) has provided some interesting characterizations on how law enforcement organizations go about tracking down suspicious financial transactions through some more recent crime mapping and broader geographical tracking information technology.  These Information Technology crime fighting tools have largely cut down the huge cost that was associated with how law enforcement agencies extract intelligence.  “Data are lot more easily obtained and handled these days” and thanks to such geographical information system (GIS) tools like CompStat used both in hotspot mapping and geographic profiling, Ratcliffe (2004).

Research has shown that there is a strong link between offenders’ behavior and victimization and the place or locations in which they commit crimes, Bottom & Wiles (2002). To some extent, federal law enforcement agencies have mostly be success in disabling the terrorist machinery largely through the development of spatial systems that sort of preempt or predict just how terrorists think, (Fotheringham et al. 2002).


Place Based System and Place Based Science


Place base analysis as proposed in (Weisburd 2004), has two components, statistical place based analysis and place based modeling proposed in (Fischer et al. 1996). “First there

has been an increase in the development of statistical place based tools, containing in the recent development of geographically weighted regression techniques (Fotheringham et al. 2002).” Secondly, and arguably more usefully for crime reduction planning and policy, there has been an expansion in the number of techniques available for exploratory spatial data analysis (ESDA), techniques that can be applied in a spatial or place based modeling environment to reveal crime patterns and hotspots, (Weisburd 2004).

Exploratory spatial data system (ESDA) was developed from exploratory data system; the later is not so developed. For most part ESPA is a very strong analytical tool that researchers used in various research endeavors and it examines very closely, the spatial component of a piece of data, (Fotheringham et al. 2002). Even though most crime data is said to comprise some spatial features, ESDA investigates patterns in the data mostly from the geographic perspective such that similar or other components between datum points are either of secondary or inferior consideration or are utilize in a complementary role that refines the spatial analysis, Ratcliffe 2002).  

However, to consider a piece of information as subordinate to another should not seen as diminishing the value of other data variables within crime records: other non-spatial features within crime records have been found to provide valuable insight into offender behavior, especially temporal, Ratcliffe (2002)” and modus operandi variables. Bennell & Canter 2002) states that in the data analysis aspect of a study, ESDA only promotes the spatial exploration at the top of the analysis, and with this focused interest comes a new innovative spatial processes designed to uncover geographical patterns within data, and it was this piece of assurance that capacitated the Bush administration that made it branded a piece of the puzzle as “an access of evil.

The fight to uncover terrorist financial dealings especially at the bank level requires complete collaboration between bank officials and other instructions like phone companies that collect vital data on people.  And at the bank level, there is an exhaustive one tier process known as “remediation”, in which those financial institutions carefully peruse their databases to ascertain personal information of customers who may have been placed on sanction lists (Bottom & Wiles 2002).

US Counter Terrorism Strategy in Perspective

In addition to a host of strategies used by the United States to combat terrorism, there is an official national strategy for combating terrorism that has been compiled into a 30-page interagency document released by the White House on February of 2003 (Washington, DC: February 14, 2003). The national strategy assigns the Department of Homeland Security as the sole institution responsible for preventing terrorist attacks within the United States, while the national strategy for combating terrorism is primarily focused on “identifying and defusing threats before they reach the U.S. borders”.  Nonetheless, a key component within the national security strategy is preemptive strike, reducing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction along with an in-depth defense mechanism. Obviously, the intent of the national strategy as contained in its preamble, is to “prevent terrorist attacks against the United States, its citizens, its interests, and U.S. friends and allies around the world, as well as to create an international environment inhospitable to terrorists and their supporters.” Particular emphasis that “all instruments of U.S. power-diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, financial, information dissemination, intelligence, and military-are to be called upon in combating international terrorism.”

Invariably, the strategy suits the wider strategy objective of the “in-dept defense” four concentric components of defense against terrorist attacks on the United States; this also matches the British national security strategy of 2003-defeating, denying, diminishing, and defending (http://usinfo.state.gov/ei/Archive/2003/Dec/31-646035.html). Along with its allies, the United States engages terrorists through attacking their hideouts, leadership, command, control, communications, finances, and material support (Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report RS21902).  Within the national strategy, the U.S. pursues terrorists by firstly identifying and locating them through optimal use of intelligence assistance both nationally and internationally, destroying terrorists wherever they are found, and along with their organizations; capture, detain and prosecute them where possible.

In addition to the use of intelligence and other U.S. paramilitary units, the use of Special Forces and other military power, and employment of specialized intelligence resources, and international cooperation talked about earlier in this paper are used to curb terrorist funding. And as mentioned, earlier with the enactment of the Patriot Act, the U.S. ensures that other sovereign states or nations take action comprising of denying terrorists state sponsorship, support, and sanctuary/safe havens on terrorist elements within their borders and areas of influence. Other elements identified with the U.S. national security strategy include, tailoring strategies to include individual state sponsors of terrorism to change policies; promoting international standards for combating terrorism; eliminating structures; and interdicting terrorists ground, air, maritime, and cyber traffic, in order to deny terrorists access to arms, financing, information, WMD materials, sensitive technology, recruits, and funding from illicit drug activities, please (See “Combating Terrorism: the 9/11 Commission Recommendations and the National Strategies,” testimony of Raphael Perl before the House Subcommittee on National Security Emerging Threats, and International Relations, September 22, 2004).

The U.S. national terrorist strategy is somehow endorsed by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 which requires member states to take measures in curbing terrorist financing. Other ambitions that the U.S. National Security strategy have on terrorism is to ensure that the underlying opportunities terrorists exploit are diminished. In partnering with international partners, the U.S. encourages ally partners to foster economic, social, and political development, market-based economies, good governance, and the rule of law, all to eliminate conditions that lead to failed states, a good opportunity to induce terrorism (Perry 2004).

By going after and denying terrorist financing, the U.S. makes it a core national security objective as enshrined in pillars one and two of the National Security Strategy with the clear hope of disabling their machinery: all of this will be made possible through law enforcement cooperation which makes it key within its own context, Perl (2004). In summing up, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism places a moderate to strong priority on combating terrorist financing which it views primarily within the context of a law enforcement framework centering on international cooperation (Perry 2004). Under the strategy, the primary reason for a policy focus on the financing of terrorists’ activities is to deny them funding which in turn disrupts and destabilizes their operations by causing them to expend added effort to secure funding at the expense of other operational activities concluded Perry(2004). Although the strategy does not specifically address the use of covert operation as a means of disrupting terrorist financing, arguably such activity is contemplated as part of the overall preemptive network-destabilizing approach it seeks to advocate (Emerson 2002).

But before analyzing some of the efforts made by the U.S. government to strangle terrorists funding avenues, let’s look at other avenues or further efforts taken to block funding sources of terrorism. Firstly, immediately following the 9/11 attack, a commission was set up to investigate where things went wrong that provided the opportunity for the attack to be possible. On July 22, 2004 the National Commission on Terrorist Attack submitted its final report, and among some of the recommendations put forward, and primary among key recommendations made is to change the way the government is set to combat terrorism and how it set its priorities (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks report). In part, most of the recommendations are in line with the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism put out in February 2003.

Comparing both the National Commission on Terrorist Attack report to that of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, there are some key similar policy recommendations reflecting in one and the other. For instance both documents share these issue in tandem, such as combating terrorism, the issues on diplomacy and counter-–proliferation efforts, preemption, intelligence and information assortment, winning minds through diplomacy, and including encouraging more open societies, law enforcement cooperation, combating terrorist financing, and defending the homeland falls mainly into varying categories like preemption aspect of the national strategy on combating terrorism, which has to do with attacking terrorists, preventing the growth of Islamic terrorism by methods that include targeting financial facilitators and funds; protecting against and preparing for attacks; coordination and unity of operational planning, intelligence and sharing of information; enhancing, through centralization, congressional effectiveness of intelligence and counter-terrorism oversight, authorization, and appropriations;  centralizing congressional oversight and review of homeland security activities; and increasing FBI, DOD, and DHS capacity to assess terrorist threats and their concomitant response strategies and capabilities (Perl 2004).

And the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks in whole calls for openly confronting problems in the U.S. - Saudi relationship, among others, to include terrorist financing and the billions of dollars as support to a fundamentalist madrasa schools; and on the contrary, sustaining aid to Pakistan and Afghanistan both considered as key strategic war on terror allies in the region (911 Final Report July 22, 2004).  In addition, there was a supplemental report issued by the 9/11 Commission that essentially advocated for “Vigorous efforts to track terrorist financing must remain the central priority of the U.S. counter terrorism efforts. 

The government has recognized that information about terrorist money helps us to understand their networks, search them out, and disrupt their operations. It continues by saying that intelligence and law enforcement have targeted the relatively small number of financial facilitators–individuals al-Qaeda relied on for their ability to raise and deliver money–at the core of al Qaeda’s revenue stream. According to the Bush Administration, these efforts have worked. The death or capture of several important facilitators has decreased the amount of money available to al Qaeda and has increased its costs and difficulty in raising and moving the money. In addition, captured terrorists have additionally provided an extra intelligence that can be used to continue the cycle of disruption wrote (Ratcliffe 2004).

Nonetheless, before zeroing in to see just how much success the National Terrorism Strategy has scored, it is important to note that page 382 of the National Commission of Terrorism Attacks’ Final Report suggests that “an important principle of targeting terror financing is to gather information on terror network, in addition to raising the costs required to raise funds for use by al Qaeda and others.   Moreover, the Report suggests that if al Qaeda is replaced by smaller decentralized groups, the assumption that terrorists need a financial support network may become obsolete, Burton (2006). This paper will not attempt to address the concern as to whether the efforts made so far by the federal government and its allies have actually paid off or not? Based on the 9/11 Commission conclusions that so far, the U. S. Government has made little leeway in deciphering Al Qaeda funding channels and which cited the organization’s ability to adapt quickly and effectively to financial obstacles posted by government activity which in essence suggests the redefining of terrorist financing strategy goals away from a focus on seizing assets and towards a focus on gathering intelligence, (Ratcliffe 2004).

Terrorist Funding Sources

In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, government and law enforcement agencies alike were forced to act without having to firstly understand the gravity of the havoc wrecked by the terrorists on American on the one hand, and without the Bush administration having to develop the needed intelligence to go after the bad guys and their funding sources, Emerson (2004).  No one would doubt it then that it was the most bizarre and unusual incident since the bombing of Pearl Harbor, even though the government and law enforcement deserve credit for rising to the occasion untiringly to track down assets belonging to terrorists worldwide. 

Consistent with the research methodology that the use of “randomized place-based trials in evaluating hot spots that yielded some successful results on how terrorists have raised money to support their dreadful operations including  the use of charitable organizations, online based funding, financial and corporate institutions, Weisburd (2004).” Reports on the U.S. Embassies bombings in Tanzania and Kenya offer initial examples on the use of those methods. Using a broad sampling of terrorist organizations, effort will be made to clearly demonstrate the place based theory and the similarity of methods employed by terrorist organizations.

This portion of the paper will look at key participating organizations like al-Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah. Because of the ideal that charity organizations represent, that is help the needy, bringing the people and the world together, correcting the ills of the world, terrorists organizations have been able to covertly support their missions through charitable donations made by charity organizations globally (Emerson 2004).  For the United States, primary democratic ideal like the first amendment sticks out when going after charitable organizations no matter the reasons and terrorist organizations exploit this to channel their financial assets.

And every facet of the American democratic value shares some leniency toward charity organizations; for instance, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) would not scrutinize charitable organizations as it would otherwise do for-profit organizations, and especially when most of those same charity organizations have benefitted from tax payers’ dollars through donations and grants from agencies like USAID, Allen & Mufson (2001).  For example, the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLFRD) whose assets were frozen for allegedly supporting Hamas was approved to receive USAID supplemental grants made possible through tax payer money (The Washington Post. December 5, 2001).  Those efforts made at scrutinizing charity organizations have come under stark criticism on grounds of religious or ethnic profiling, and others, Emerson (2004). 

Al-Qaeda at some point has utilized the same strategy of going through charity organizations to transfer funds.  For instance, through the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), there are reports which show that many fundamentalist organizations including al-Qaeda have benefitted from lofty donations made by the IIRO, an organization that has been linked by both Canadian and American intelligence operatives to have substantial ties to al-Jihad, and also operating under the name International Relief Organization (IRO), (http://www.arab.net/iiro). Granted that these organizations had perfectly well been operated in the capacity for which they were granted a 501 (3) (C) status, extended by the IRS to institutions that have tax exempt status, but at the hype that immediately followed the 9/11 attacks, and in the quest to understand how the hijackers sustain themselves and their operations, i.e. basic things like food, clothing, shelter, including funds to procure plane tickets, the 9/11 Commission Final Report shows that these men were funded by al-Qaeda through charity organizations mostly those branded as Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT). 

Other sources of funding, most significantly have come from the trade of illegal drugs in places like Afghanistan and elsewhere already dealt with in this paper.  The 9/11 Commission Final Report also associated these organizations as having to have aided terrorist organizations prior to the 9/11 attacks, “the Wafa Humanitarian Organization, Rabita Trust for the Rehabilitation of Stranded Pakistanis, Qatar Charitable Society, al-Aqsa Educational Fund, Darkazanli Import-Export Company, Barakaat Telecommunications / InterWAVE”, and many others.

Conclusion

One good means to check against the success and setbacks of a piece of policy is through performance indicators, this also enables policy makers to effectively manage the outcomes of the project, which is by retaining those aspects that work and trash out those that are not working (Ratcliffe 2004).  Because it is not so easy to measure the successes and failures of the enormous challenges to policy makers though the financing of terror, successful output indicators cannot be measured in emptiness other than from the context of policy goals and objectives; more so when every side of the isle, terrorists and those tasked with the responsibility of combating them, all with a different goals and objectives, Perl (2005).  “For instance, success for those charged with securing an airport may be claimed by citing the absence of attacks on the facility and the heavy presence of security personnel and detection technology, and equally so, success for the terrorist network may be claimed because the enemy has expended unnecessary resources protecting a facility that was never targeted for attack, with the aggregate result of such expenditures being less available resources to devote to other counter-terror goals such as combating terrorist financing (Perl 2005),”
 

Weisburd (2004) argues that a potential consequence of success indicators is overreliance on quantitative data at the expense of its qualitative importance, therefore he cautioned that in order a multi-dimensional metric to qualitatively analyze the degree of success of a strategy designed to address the financing of terror are many. In line with this, (Emerson 2004) makes the claim that practical application of performance metrics poses no small challenge, which he categorizes as assets and funds confiscated, lack of desire of those contributing to the cause(s), inability to fund resulting from the chilling effect of policies on contributions, changes in levels of terrorist recruitment, the number of terrorist operatives apprehended or neutralized, public relations impact on a society of government policies that target terrorist financing, the disruptive effect of policies on terrorist activities and organizational infrastructures, including deterring or slowing down potential attacks, the impact of policies on coalition building, and the impact of policies in curbing other criminal activity—especially activity linked to terrorist groups—such as the illicit drug and arms trade and piracy of intellectual property.
 

Finally, there remains the intelligence value of policies employed. Clearly here, an important metric is the impact of intelligence gained on directly preventing catastrophic terrorist events which can result into a policy shift based on the realization that a certain policy focus is not attainable, either because it is cost intensive to actually deny terrorists funding in any meaningful way, due to overarching expectations (9/11 Commission Final Report). Secondly, the 9/11 Commission’s final report on many instances mentioned that terrorists increasingly scout for more informal methods of transferring and obtaining funds which makes it tougher for law enforcement agencies to seize a significant amount of money or assets.

This is not to suggest that the amount seized so far is not significant. Page 382 of the 9/11 Commission Report bearing the testimony of the Treasury Undersecretary, Samuel W. Bodman, said as of April 2004 up to $200 million have been intercepted and seized so far. The report concluded that essentially, that as terrorist networks decentralize their operations and presence, there is this likelihood that they may become financially independent making it tougher to track or interdict their assets. 

These sorts of conclusions were reached during the war on drugs concerning interdiction efforts targeting the assets generated from the drug trade. It is very difficult to say whether or not the theory of stifling terrorist assets denies terrorists of becoming inoperable in that the 9/11 Commission Report did not suggest whether going after terrorist assets may prove useful as a coalition building tool; or may have a terrifying effect on donations to terrorist organizations, resulting to a little or no recruitment of unknown sympathizers. The need to train other coalition countries engaged in the war on terror to improve their judicial and regulatory manpower resources to make them equally sophisticated like the U.S. was also not discussed in the report.

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