Research Question: will the combating of alternative terrorism funding sources eliminate the spread of global terrorism? Objective: This research is to determine whether randomized place-based trials will likely uncover financial sources that support terrorism. Design, Setting, and Participants: Analysis of efforts to prosecute charitable organizations that support terrorism, the 9/11 Commission Reports. Ethics- United States v. Holy Land Foundation for Relief & Development Less than three months after the attacks of September 11, 2001; transcripts from the Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Asset Control (OFAC), under authority of Executive Orders 12,947 and 13,224, designated the Holy Land Foundation supports Hamas. Main outcome of the research: Using case study approach, those factors that facilitate the development and implementation of randomized trials are identified with particular focus on specific problems and/or advantages of place-based experiments. Therefore going after charitable organizations and other sources that support terrorism will potentially weaken and subsequently reduce the number of attacks launched by terrorist organizations.
Abstract (Summary): Financing plays a central role in how terrorists carry out their plots. If this is true, targeting the means which terrorist organizations use to successfully accomplish their mission will drastically reduce if not eliminate terrorism. Before the advent of the September 11, 2001 attack of the New York’s World Trade Center and the Pentagon, law enforcement agencies and policy makers paid no attention to the sources that fund and sustain global terrorism. Though the passing of the USA Patriot Act was intended to address other issues that pertain to US national security, it was also important in the efforts to combat the financial sources through which terrorist organizations support their ambitions, and including money laundering. Among others, the Patriot Act had “extra-territorial” effect on banks outside of the United States. This paper will look at various sources used by terrorist organizations and sympathizers alike to finance the act globally. This paper will mostly focus on those best practices that the US federal agencies and their international partners have use to uncover financial sources that support terrorism and the repercussion those discoveries had on the terrorist organizations.
Introduction
Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, along with subsequent similar attacks exposed some weaknesses in the law enforcement structure and created the need among US policy makers to strengthen the overall response mechanisms of the national security apparatus of the US, Emerson (2002). No one will argue that the security situation nationally has changed or improved since the September 11, 2001 attacks. Neighborhoods, ports of entry, public facilities, etc have been equipped with crisis preparedness mechanisms sponsored with tax payers’ dollars. Studies have shown that both security and emergency preparedness capabilities have dramatically improved even though there are still some loopholes.
These same studies identified weaknesses and strengths of local and federal law enforcement agencies; nonetheless, very few evaluations have been undertaken nationally using the law enforcement community as the unit of analysis, www.hhs.gov/budget/04budget/fy2004bib.pdf (16 March2004). Also according to the (Washington: GAO, April 2002) community-based analysis is significant in that groundwork preparation for terrorist attacks brings together many organizations within the community, i.e. law enforcement, health-care units, transportation, media entities. Besides, using a more qualitative approach allows for the capture of market and policy factors that can affect emergency response preparedness for crises response entities, and including law enforcement agencies within a dozen nationally representative metropolitan areas since the 9/11 attacks (Washington: GAO, April, 2002).
In my opinion, since law enforcement gained more attention and support since 9/11, this is an important point in time for local communities along with policy makers to reflect on terrorism and other emergency preparedness situations. In addition, this paper will discuss changes in tactics and funding for law enforcement agencies in the first few years following the 9/11 attacks. The paper will also look at progresses made so far in disabling the financial support bases of terrorism and their abilities to launch future strikes on American targets within the US and abroad. The paper will closely look at few stimulating reports that demonstrate high level of success, focusing mainly on the issues that tend to paralyze terrorist network. Those challenges that lay along the way in getting this done in conjunction with the policy implications of the findings will also be discussed.
Research Methodology
The finding of this paper is based on the analysis on data collected based on studies conducted by the Community Tracking Study (CTS) sites visits looked at a dozen metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) two of those studies used randomized place-based trials in evaluating hot spots that can yield successful results. In those studies, the first finding is that using place-based randomized trials to evaluate hot spots a successful policing strategy in tackling crime. This conclusive statement of the studies is made against the backdrop of two randomized experiments conducted in two separate hot spots policing interventions in metropolitan Minneapolis and New Jersey City Drug Market Analysis. Using case study approach, those factors that facilitate the development and implementation of randomized trials are identified with particular focus on specific problems and/or advantages of place-based experiments.
Although this paper did not delve into the specifics of how federal agents uncover terrorist plots, it mostly looked at or at least commented on the success of place-based randomized trials of evaluating terrorist hot spots undertaken by law enforcement agencies. Attention will be drawn also to the reason why the successful example of experiments in hot spots policing has not inspired similar place-based experimentation in other areas of the criminal field or policing. There are other lessons on the implementation and development of place-based randomized experimental methods that are generally identified but did not play much role in this research.
This paper hopes to explain in detail the use and importance of randomized policy experiments in that it produces more valid answers to most policy questions than other research methods that lack random testing. For instance, Feeder & Boruch (2000) wrote that there is little or no room for disagreement that experiment in general provides exceptional method to assess the exactness of a given intervention. Weisburd (2004) noted that experiments remain the idiosyncratic method rather than a way of life in the field of policy research. In his advocacy that policy be scientifically researched just as in medicine before put to the test, Jonathan Shepherd further said that “policing tactics, teaching techniques and sentencing would benefit from a the same kind of rigorous assessment, but are rarely subject to scientific analysis, he told (The Times July, 2009). Shepherd makes the observation because according to him “efforts to document the failure rates of those US and British criminal justice funding institutions that choose to support other research initiatives in treatment evaluation other than randomized experiments revealed a high failure rate”.
While there are many other methods of conducting research in the criminal justice field, the number of people attracted to randomized research is outstanding though the number of randomized experiments accounted for so far is still relatively low compared to areas like medical research observed Petrosino (2000) . In the same research conducted by Petrosino (2000), over three hundred randomized studies that are relevant to criminal justice problems were documented. Weisburd (2004) concluded that it is no longer relevant to further the argument that randomized experiments cannot be carried out in criminal justice. The question that remains to be answered is: what then seem to be the problem that criminal justice experiments have not yet move into the mainstream of criminal justice evaluations?
Law Enforcement Readiness since 9/11
Up until the 9/11 World Trade Center attack, United States policy makers and federal law enforcement agencies paid little or no attention to how terrorist organizations fund their missions, Bedi (2004). Research shows that though the USA Patriot Act was initially passed to deal with other national security concerns of the United States, this piece of legislation now serves as a vital tool to pursue money laundering activities, and those financial sources that support terrorism efforts, El-Sheik (2005 According to Robinson (2006), one key importance of the Patriot Act is its “extra-territorial” influence on financial institutions outside the United States. ). Based on the methodology adopted for this research, sources and means through which terrorists fund their operations would be interchangeably referred to as hotspots.
After seeing the role that financing played in global terrorism policymakers came to recognize the need to focus their attention on the financial sources that terrorist organizations use to finance their operations. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, policymakers also realized that in order to effectively combat this aspect of terrorism, policymakers need to better understand the variety of financial mechanisms that terrorists employ to fund their organizations.
The 9/11 Commission Report also reveals that legitimate financial institutions are manipulated by terrorist organizations to execute legal transactions on their behalf in the form of profits generated from doing business legally, and charity donations. Other sources of financing also come from illicit activities such as drug trafficking. Since doing business formally with most international financial systems is the perfect legal way to go, terrorist organizations before 9/11 manipulated these financial systems by executing legal transactions to fund illegal activities, Burton (2006).
The prevalence of Internet and offshore banking presents additional barriers to law enforcement and intelligence authorities in their attempts to monitor global finances. Internet banking enables terrorists to transfer funds quickly and virtually anonymously and, due to its extensive use by the general public and the surplus of transactions that occur each day, tracking these is a major logistical challenge. According to Bedi (2004), there is no institution to regulate the Internet and few national (and no international) laws guiding its use, so states have modest resources to scrutinize Internet banking. Burton (2006) argues that offshore banks present a hurdle to law enforcement agencies because of bank secrecy laws that exist in places such as exotic vacation spots like the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands. Bank accounts are protected and can remain so unless one presents overwhelming evidence that they are connected to illegal activities, which is oftentimes extremely difficult to obtain, Robinson (2006). The burden of proof lies with law enforcement agencies because national banking laws do not easily transfer from one state to another and actions that are deemed illegal by the United States may not be considered so overseas.
Funding of Terrorism
After the first World Trade Center bombing in February 1993, Mohammed Salameh, the first apprehended suspect was denied a 5 million-dollar bond by the judge presiding over the case even though this “poor, unemployed illegal immigrant” came up with the money, Ehrenfeld (2002). But just as the case with Salameh, the eight men who were apprehended after him for their alleged intention to blow up the Manhattan Tunnel, along with bridges and possibly assassinate some public officials were also able to put forth bonds to secure their bails, Robinson (2006). Firstly, no one questioned the moral justification or reasons why those organizations or sources that provided the funds to secure the release of these nine men, and including Salameh. And moreover, the question on the significance of funding to terrorism became mainly an issue in the wake of the 9/11 attacks (911 Commission Report, July 2004).
But almost certainly, civil liberty institutions soon began questioning Federal Government’s move of clamping down on those “charitable organizations” and sympathizing partners suspected to be behind a number of the financial transfers made to terrorist organizations worldwide, Nichols (2008). In addition, Ehrenfeld (2002) claims that funds generated from the illegal drug sale of opium and cocaine largely fuel terrorist activities globally. Besides, research has shown that the illegal trade of narcotic constitutes the main source of funding that supports terrorism, Blank (2001). By this time, Federal law enforcement agencies and their international partners have a mindset as to who their targets were.
Research Methodology
The finding of this paper is based on the analysis on data collected based on studies conducted by the Community Tracking Study (CTS) sites visits looked at a dozen metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) two of those studies used randomized place-based trials in evaluating hot spots that can yield successful results. In those studies, the first finding is that using place-based randomized trials to evaluate hot spots a successful policing strategy in tackling crime. This conclusive statement of the studies is made against the backdrop of two randomized experiments conducted in two separate hot spots policing interventions in metropolitan Minneapolis and New Jersey City Drug Market Analysis. Using case study approach, those factors that facilitate the development and implementation of randomized trials are identified with particular focus on specific problems and/or advantages of place-based experiments.
Although this paper did not delve into the specifics of how federal agents uncover terrorist plots, it mostly looked at or at least commented on the success of place-based randomized trials of evaluating terrorist hot spots undertaken by law enforcement agencies. Attention will be drawn also to the reason why the successful example of experiments in hot spots policing has not inspired similar place-based experimentation in other areas of the criminal field or policing. There are other lessons on the implementation and development of place-based randomized experimental methods that are generally identified but did not play much role in this research.
This paper hopes to explain in detail the use and importance of randomized policy experiments in that it produces more valid answers to most policy questions than other research methods that lack random testing. For instance, Feeder & Boruch (2000) wrote that there is little or no room for disagreement that experiment in general provides exceptional method to assess the exactness of a given intervention. Weisburd (2004) noted that experiments remain the idiosyncratic method rather than a way of life in the field of policy research. In his advocacy that policy be scientifically researched just as in medicine before put to the test, Jonathan Shepherd further said that “policing tactics, teaching techniques and sentencing would benefit from a the same kind of rigorous assessment, but are rarely subject to scientific analysis, he told (The Times July, 2009). Shepherd makes the observation because according to him “efforts to document the failure rates of those US and British criminal justice funding institutions that choose to support other research initiatives in treatment evaluation other than randomized experiments revealed a high failure rate”.
While there are many other methods of conducting research in the criminal justice field, the number of people attracted to randomized research is outstanding though the number of randomized experiments accounted for so far is still relatively low compared to areas like medical research observed Petrosino (2000) . In the same research conducted by Petrosino (2000), over three hundred randomized studies that are relevant to criminal justice problems were documented. Weisburd (2004) concluded that it is no longer relevant to further the argument that randomized experiments cannot be carried out in criminal justice. The question that remains to be answered is: what then seem to be the problem that criminal justice experiments have not yet move into the mainstream of criminal justice evaluations?
Law Enforcement Readiness since 9/11
Up until the 9/11 World Trade Center attack, United States policy makers and federal law enforcement agencies paid little or no attention to how terrorist organizations fund their missions, Bedi (2004). Research shows that though the USA Patriot Act was initially passed to deal with other national security concerns of the United States, this piece of legislation now serves as a vital tool to pursue money laundering activities, and those financial sources that support terrorism efforts, El-Sheik (2005 According to Robinson (2006), one key importance of the Patriot Act is its “extra-territorial” influence on financial institutions outside the United States. ). Based on the methodology adopted for this research, sources and means through which terrorists fund their operations would be interchangeably referred to as hotspots.
After seeing the role that financing played in global terrorism policymakers came to recognize the need to focus their attention on the financial sources that terrorist organizations use to finance their operations. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, policymakers also realized that in order to effectively combat this aspect of terrorism, policymakers need to better understand the variety of financial mechanisms that terrorists employ to fund their organizations.
The 9/11 Commission Report also reveals that legitimate financial institutions are manipulated by terrorist organizations to execute legal transactions on their behalf in the form of profits generated from doing business legally, and charity donations. Other sources of financing also come from illicit activities such as drug trafficking. Since doing business formally with most international financial systems is the perfect legal way to go, terrorist organizations before 9/11 manipulated these financial systems by executing legal transactions to fund illegal activities, Burton (2006).
The prevalence of Internet and offshore banking presents additional barriers to law enforcement and intelligence authorities in their attempts to monitor global finances. Internet banking enables terrorists to transfer funds quickly and virtually anonymously and, due to its extensive use by the general public and the surplus of transactions that occur each day, tracking these is a major logistical challenge. According to Bedi (2004), there is no institution to regulate the Internet and few national (and no international) laws guiding its use, so states have modest resources to scrutinize Internet banking. Burton (2006) argues that offshore banks present a hurdle to law enforcement agencies because of bank secrecy laws that exist in places such as exotic vacation spots like the Bahamas and the Cayman Islands. Bank accounts are protected and can remain so unless one presents overwhelming evidence that they are connected to illegal activities, which is oftentimes extremely difficult to obtain, Robinson (2006). The burden of proof lies with law enforcement agencies because national banking laws do not easily transfer from one state to another and actions that are deemed illegal by the United States may not be considered so overseas.
Funding of Terrorism
After the first World Trade Center bombing in February 1993, Mohammed Salameh, the first apprehended suspect was denied a 5 million-dollar bond by the judge presiding over the case even though this “poor, unemployed illegal immigrant” came up with the money, Ehrenfeld (2002). But just as the case with Salameh, the eight men who were apprehended after him for their alleged intention to blow up the Manhattan Tunnel, along with bridges and possibly assassinate some public officials were also able to put forth bonds to secure their bails, Robinson (2006). Firstly, no one questioned the moral justification or reasons why those organizations or sources that provided the funds to secure the release of these nine men, and including Salameh. And moreover, the question on the significance of funding to terrorism became mainly an issue in the wake of the 9/11 attacks (911 Commission Report, July 2004).
But almost certainly, civil liberty institutions soon began questioning Federal Government’s move of clamping down on those “charitable organizations” and sympathizing partners suspected to be behind a number of the financial transfers made to terrorist organizations worldwide, Nichols (2008). In addition, Ehrenfeld (2002) claims that funds generated from the illegal drug sale of opium and cocaine largely fuel terrorist activities globally. Besides, research has shown that the illegal trade of narcotic constitutes the main source of funding that supports terrorism, Blank (2001). By this time, Federal law enforcement agencies and their international partners have a mindset as to who their targets were.
President Bush’s statement that “money is the life-blood of terrorist operations – and today we are asking the world to stop payment” makes it apparent that his administration was preparing to go after those institutions that support terrorism, Emerson (2002). In addition, his administration’s full court press engagement to freeze, seize, confiscate, and perhaps stagnate the flow of funds to terrorist without putting together a formidable action plan and intelligence on how to address the situation, and this only tells how desperate the administration was, Washington Post (December, 2001). The moral dilemma faced by federal law enforcement agents going after charitable and other institutions which provide financial support to terrorist organizations is the difficulty in balancing the inherent freedom enjoyed by Americans versus weeding out the bad people for the common good of all.
Going after Terrorist Hotspots is a Costly Venture
Because of the level of accuracy and coordination with which the terrorists carried out the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration had put the “war on terror” on the top of its agenda mainly due to political pressure from the American people, Britain, and to some extent, the UN (The Economist, October 22, 2005). The result of this is that it created a situation where in those tasked with the responsibilities of managing financial assets such as accountants, solicitors, investment bankers, etc have joined the law enforcement community to haunt down terrorists wherever they exist. Emerson (2002) stated that the private sector bears the major burden of the effort to choke off funding for terrorists, and hence banks and other financial institutions are scanning their customer accounts more carefully for signs of suspicious people and transactions. Graham Dillon, a top Executive of KPMG a consulting firm based in London, claimed that Millions of prospective and current bank customers are hampered by tougher compliance standards, and that anti-money-laundering technology is focused on identifying suspicious transactions that bear little resemblance to those typically used by terrorists. He contends that current technology could be reconfigured to check for things that better fit the profile of terrorist financing.
The total cost of complying with anti-terror financing regulations is difficult to determine partly because many institutions (private and governmental) tackle the issue in tandem with money laundering, a separate financial crime. The British Bankers' Association (BBA) estimates that banks in Britain spend about £250 million each year to comply with regulations on the two sorts of crime. According to a global study of about 200 banks last year by KPMG, those interviewed increased investments on anti-money-laundering activities by an average of 61% in the prior three years. Just how difficult the fight to pursue so called charitable organizations and others who provide financial supports to fund terrorist activities globally, and which is the main focus of this research?
Ratcliffe (2004) has provided some interesting characterizations on how law enforcement organizations go about tracking down suspicious financial transactions through some more recent crime mapping and broader geographical tracking information technology. These Information Technology crime fighting tools have largely cut down the huge cost that was associated with how law enforcement agencies extract intelligence. “Data are lot more easily obtained and handled these days” and thanks to such geographical information system (GIS) tools like CompStat used both in hotspot mapping and geographic profiling, Ratcliffe (2004).
Research has shown that there is a strong link between offenders’ behavior and victimization and the place or locations in which they commit crimes, Bottom & Wiles (2002). To some extent, federal law enforcement agencies have mostly be success in disabling the terrorist machinery largely through the development of spatial systems that sort of preempt or predict just how terrorists think, (Fotheringham et al. 2002).
Place Based System and Place Based Science
Place base analysis as proposed in (Weisburd 2004), has two components, statistical place based analysis and place based modeling proposed in (Fischer et al. 1996). “First there
has been an increase in the development of statistical place based tools, containing in the recent development of geographically weighted regression techniques (Fotheringham et al. 2002).” Secondly, and arguably more usefully for crime reduction planning and policy, there has been an expansion in the number of techniques available for exploratory spatial data analysis (ESDA), techniques that can be applied in a spatial or place based modeling environment to reveal crime patterns and hotspots, (Weisburd 2004).
Exploratory spatial data system (ESDA) was developed from exploratory data system; the later is not so developed. For most part ESPA is a very strong analytical tool that researchers used in various research endeavors and it examines very closely, the spatial component of a piece of data, (Fotheringham et al. 2002). Even though most crime data is said to comprise some spatial features, ESDA investigates patterns in the data mostly from the geographic perspective such that similar or other components between datum points are either of secondary or inferior consideration or are utilize in a complementary role that refines the spatial analysis, Ratcliffe 2002).
Going after Terrorist Hotspots is a Costly Venture
Because of the level of accuracy and coordination with which the terrorists carried out the 9/11 attacks, the Bush administration had put the “war on terror” on the top of its agenda mainly due to political pressure from the American people, Britain, and to some extent, the UN (The Economist, October 22, 2005). The result of this is that it created a situation where in those tasked with the responsibilities of managing financial assets such as accountants, solicitors, investment bankers, etc have joined the law enforcement community to haunt down terrorists wherever they exist. Emerson (2002) stated that the private sector bears the major burden of the effort to choke off funding for terrorists, and hence banks and other financial institutions are scanning their customer accounts more carefully for signs of suspicious people and transactions. Graham Dillon, a top Executive of KPMG a consulting firm based in London, claimed that Millions of prospective and current bank customers are hampered by tougher compliance standards, and that anti-money-laundering technology is focused on identifying suspicious transactions that bear little resemblance to those typically used by terrorists. He contends that current technology could be reconfigured to check for things that better fit the profile of terrorist financing.
The total cost of complying with anti-terror financing regulations is difficult to determine partly because many institutions (private and governmental) tackle the issue in tandem with money laundering, a separate financial crime. The British Bankers' Association (BBA) estimates that banks in Britain spend about £250 million each year to comply with regulations on the two sorts of crime. According to a global study of about 200 banks last year by KPMG, those interviewed increased investments on anti-money-laundering activities by an average of 61% in the prior three years. Just how difficult the fight to pursue so called charitable organizations and others who provide financial supports to fund terrorist activities globally, and which is the main focus of this research?
Ratcliffe (2004) has provided some interesting characterizations on how law enforcement organizations go about tracking down suspicious financial transactions through some more recent crime mapping and broader geographical tracking information technology. These Information Technology crime fighting tools have largely cut down the huge cost that was associated with how law enforcement agencies extract intelligence. “Data are lot more easily obtained and handled these days” and thanks to such geographical information system (GIS) tools like CompStat used both in hotspot mapping and geographic profiling, Ratcliffe (2004).
Research has shown that there is a strong link between offenders’ behavior and victimization and the place or locations in which they commit crimes, Bottom & Wiles (2002). To some extent, federal law enforcement agencies have mostly be success in disabling the terrorist machinery largely through the development of spatial systems that sort of preempt or predict just how terrorists think, (Fotheringham et al. 2002).
Place Based System and Place Based Science
Place base analysis as proposed in (Weisburd 2004), has two components, statistical place based analysis and place based modeling proposed in (Fischer et al. 1996). “First there
has been an increase in the development of statistical place based tools, containing in the recent development of geographically weighted regression techniques (Fotheringham et al. 2002).” Secondly, and arguably more usefully for crime reduction planning and policy, there has been an expansion in the number of techniques available for exploratory spatial data analysis (ESDA), techniques that can be applied in a spatial or place based modeling environment to reveal crime patterns and hotspots, (Weisburd 2004).
Exploratory spatial data system (ESDA) was developed from exploratory data system; the later is not so developed. For most part ESPA is a very strong analytical tool that researchers used in various research endeavors and it examines very closely, the spatial component of a piece of data, (Fotheringham et al. 2002). Even though most crime data is said to comprise some spatial features, ESDA investigates patterns in the data mostly from the geographic perspective such that similar or other components between datum points are either of secondary or inferior consideration or are utilize in a complementary role that refines the spatial analysis, Ratcliffe 2002).
However, to consider a piece of information as subordinate to another should not seen as diminishing the value of other data variables within crime records: other non-spatial features within crime records have been found to provide valuable insight into offender behavior, especially temporal, Ratcliffe (2002)” and modus operandi variables. Bennell & Canter 2002) states that in the data analysis aspect of a study, ESDA only promotes the spatial exploration at the top of the analysis, and with this focused interest comes a new innovative spatial processes designed to uncover geographical patterns within data, and it was this piece of assurance that capacitated the Bush administration that made it branded a piece of the puzzle as “an access of evil.
The fight to uncover terrorist financial dealings especially at the bank level requires complete collaboration between bank officials and other instructions like phone companies that collect vital data on people. And at the bank level, there is an exhaustive one tier process known as “remediation”, in which those financial institutions carefully peruse their databases to ascertain personal information of customers who may have been placed on sanction lists (Bottom & Wiles 2002).
US Counter Terrorism Strategy in Perspective
In addition to a host of strategies used by the United States to combat terrorism, there is an official national strategy for combating terrorism that has been compiled into a 30-page interagency document released by the White House on February of 2003 (Washington, DC: February 14, 2003). The national strategy assigns the Department of Homeland Security as the sole institution responsible for preventing terrorist attacks within the United States, while the national strategy for combating terrorism is primarily focused on “identifying and defusing threats before they reach the U.S. borders”. Nonetheless, a key component within the national security strategy is preemptive strike, reducing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction along with an in-depth defense mechanism. Obviously, the intent of the national strategy as contained in its preamble, is to “prevent terrorist attacks against the United States, its citizens, its interests, and U.S. friends and allies around the world, as well as to create an international environment inhospitable to terrorists and their supporters.” Particular emphasis that “all instruments of U.S. power-diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, financial, information dissemination, intelligence, and military-are to be called upon in combating international terrorism.”
Invariably, the strategy suits the wider strategy objective of the “in-dept defense” four concentric components of defense against terrorist attacks on the United States; this also matches the British national security strategy of 2003-defeating, denying, diminishing, and defending (http://usinfo.state.gov/ei/Archive/2003/Dec/31-646035.html). Along with its allies, the United States engages terrorists through attacking their hideouts, leadership, command, control, communications, finances, and material support (Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report RS21902). Within the national strategy, the U.S. pursues terrorists by firstly identifying and locating them through optimal use of intelligence assistance both nationally and internationally, destroying terrorists wherever they are found, and along with their organizations; capture, detain and prosecute them where possible.
In addition to the use of intelligence and other U.S. paramilitary units, the use of Special Forces and other military power, and employment of specialized intelligence resources, and international cooperation talked about earlier in this paper are used to curb terrorist funding. And as mentioned, earlier with the enactment of the Patriot Act, the U.S. ensures that other sovereign states or nations take action comprising of denying terrorists state sponsorship, support, and sanctuary/safe havens on terrorist elements within their borders and areas of influence. Other elements identified with the U.S. national security strategy include, tailoring strategies to include individual state sponsors of terrorism to change policies; promoting international standards for combating terrorism; eliminating structures; and interdicting terrorists ground, air, maritime, and cyber traffic, in order to deny terrorists access to arms, financing, information, WMD materials, sensitive technology, recruits, and funding from illicit drug activities, please (See “Combating Terrorism: the 9/11 Commission Recommendations and the National Strategies,” testimony of Raphael Perl before the House Subcommittee on National Security Emerging Threats, and International Relations, September 22, 2004).
The U.S. national terrorist strategy is somehow endorsed by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 which requires member states to take measures in curbing terrorist financing. Other ambitions that the U.S. National Security strategy have on terrorism is to ensure that the underlying opportunities terrorists exploit are diminished. In partnering with international partners, the U.S. encourages ally partners to foster economic, social, and political development, market-based economies, good governance, and the rule of law, all to eliminate conditions that lead to failed states, a good opportunity to induce terrorism (Perry 2004).
By going after and denying terrorist financing, the U.S. makes it a core national security objective as enshrined in pillars one and two of the National Security Strategy with the clear hope of disabling their machinery: all of this will be made possible through law enforcement cooperation which makes it key within its own context, Perl (2004). In summing up, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism places a moderate to strong priority on combating terrorist financing which it views primarily within the context of a law enforcement framework centering on international cooperation (Perry 2004). Under the strategy, the primary reason for a policy focus on the financing of terrorists’ activities is to deny them funding which in turn disrupts and destabilizes their operations by causing them to expend added effort to secure funding at the expense of other operational activities concluded Perry(2004). Although the strategy does not specifically address the use of covert operation as a means of disrupting terrorist financing, arguably such activity is contemplated as part of the overall preemptive network-destabilizing approach it seeks to advocate (Emerson 2002).
But before analyzing some of the efforts made by the U.S. government to strangle terrorists funding avenues, let’s look at other avenues or further efforts taken to block funding sources of terrorism. Firstly, immediately following the 9/11 attack, a commission was set up to investigate where things went wrong that provided the opportunity for the attack to be possible. On July 22, 2004 the National Commission on Terrorist Attack submitted its final report, and among some of the recommendations put forward, and primary among key recommendations made is to change the way the government is set to combat terrorism and how it set its priorities (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks report). In part, most of the recommendations are in line with the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism put out in February 2003.
Comparing both the National Commission on Terrorist Attack report to that of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, there are some key similar policy recommendations reflecting in one and the other. For instance both documents share these issue in tandem, such as combating terrorism, the issues on diplomacy and counter-–proliferation efforts, preemption, intelligence and information assortment, winning minds through diplomacy, and including encouraging more open societies, law enforcement cooperation, combating terrorist financing, and defending the homeland falls mainly into varying categories like preemption aspect of the national strategy on combating terrorism, which has to do with attacking terrorists, preventing the growth of Islamic terrorism by methods that include targeting financial facilitators and funds; protecting against and preparing for attacks; coordination and unity of operational planning, intelligence and sharing of information; enhancing, through centralization, congressional effectiveness of intelligence and counter-terrorism oversight, authorization, and appropriations; centralizing congressional oversight and review of homeland security activities; and increasing FBI, DOD, and DHS capacity to assess terrorist threats and their concomitant response strategies and capabilities (Perl 2004).
And the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks in whole calls for openly confronting problems in the U.S. - Saudi relationship, among others, to include terrorist financing and the billions of dollars as support to a fundamentalist madrasa schools; and on the contrary, sustaining aid to Pakistan and Afghanistan both considered as key strategic war on terror allies in the region (911 Final Report July 22, 2004). In addition, there was a supplemental report issued by the 9/11 Commission that essentially advocated for “Vigorous efforts to track terrorist financing must remain the central priority of the U.S. counter terrorism efforts.
The fight to uncover terrorist financial dealings especially at the bank level requires complete collaboration between bank officials and other instructions like phone companies that collect vital data on people. And at the bank level, there is an exhaustive one tier process known as “remediation”, in which those financial institutions carefully peruse their databases to ascertain personal information of customers who may have been placed on sanction lists (Bottom & Wiles 2002).
US Counter Terrorism Strategy in Perspective
In addition to a host of strategies used by the United States to combat terrorism, there is an official national strategy for combating terrorism that has been compiled into a 30-page interagency document released by the White House on February of 2003 (Washington, DC: February 14, 2003). The national strategy assigns the Department of Homeland Security as the sole institution responsible for preventing terrorist attacks within the United States, while the national strategy for combating terrorism is primarily focused on “identifying and defusing threats before they reach the U.S. borders”. Nonetheless, a key component within the national security strategy is preemptive strike, reducing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction along with an in-depth defense mechanism. Obviously, the intent of the national strategy as contained in its preamble, is to “prevent terrorist attacks against the United States, its citizens, its interests, and U.S. friends and allies around the world, as well as to create an international environment inhospitable to terrorists and their supporters.” Particular emphasis that “all instruments of U.S. power-diplomatic, economic, law enforcement, financial, information dissemination, intelligence, and military-are to be called upon in combating international terrorism.”
Invariably, the strategy suits the wider strategy objective of the “in-dept defense” four concentric components of defense against terrorist attacks on the United States; this also matches the British national security strategy of 2003-defeating, denying, diminishing, and defending (http://usinfo.state.gov/ei/Archive/2003/Dec/31-646035.html). Along with its allies, the United States engages terrorists through attacking their hideouts, leadership, command, control, communications, finances, and material support (Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report RS21902). Within the national strategy, the U.S. pursues terrorists by firstly identifying and locating them through optimal use of intelligence assistance both nationally and internationally, destroying terrorists wherever they are found, and along with their organizations; capture, detain and prosecute them where possible.
In addition to the use of intelligence and other U.S. paramilitary units, the use of Special Forces and other military power, and employment of specialized intelligence resources, and international cooperation talked about earlier in this paper are used to curb terrorist funding. And as mentioned, earlier with the enactment of the Patriot Act, the U.S. ensures that other sovereign states or nations take action comprising of denying terrorists state sponsorship, support, and sanctuary/safe havens on terrorist elements within their borders and areas of influence. Other elements identified with the U.S. national security strategy include, tailoring strategies to include individual state sponsors of terrorism to change policies; promoting international standards for combating terrorism; eliminating structures; and interdicting terrorists ground, air, maritime, and cyber traffic, in order to deny terrorists access to arms, financing, information, WMD materials, sensitive technology, recruits, and funding from illicit drug activities, please (See “Combating Terrorism: the 9/11 Commission Recommendations and the National Strategies,” testimony of Raphael Perl before the House Subcommittee on National Security Emerging Threats, and International Relations, September 22, 2004).
The U.S. national terrorist strategy is somehow endorsed by United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373 which requires member states to take measures in curbing terrorist financing. Other ambitions that the U.S. National Security strategy have on terrorism is to ensure that the underlying opportunities terrorists exploit are diminished. In partnering with international partners, the U.S. encourages ally partners to foster economic, social, and political development, market-based economies, good governance, and the rule of law, all to eliminate conditions that lead to failed states, a good opportunity to induce terrorism (Perry 2004).
By going after and denying terrorist financing, the U.S. makes it a core national security objective as enshrined in pillars one and two of the National Security Strategy with the clear hope of disabling their machinery: all of this will be made possible through law enforcement cooperation which makes it key within its own context, Perl (2004). In summing up, the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism places a moderate to strong priority on combating terrorist financing which it views primarily within the context of a law enforcement framework centering on international cooperation (Perry 2004). Under the strategy, the primary reason for a policy focus on the financing of terrorists’ activities is to deny them funding which in turn disrupts and destabilizes their operations by causing them to expend added effort to secure funding at the expense of other operational activities concluded Perry(2004). Although the strategy does not specifically address the use of covert operation as a means of disrupting terrorist financing, arguably such activity is contemplated as part of the overall preemptive network-destabilizing approach it seeks to advocate (Emerson 2002).
But before analyzing some of the efforts made by the U.S. government to strangle terrorists funding avenues, let’s look at other avenues or further efforts taken to block funding sources of terrorism. Firstly, immediately following the 9/11 attack, a commission was set up to investigate where things went wrong that provided the opportunity for the attack to be possible. On July 22, 2004 the National Commission on Terrorist Attack submitted its final report, and among some of the recommendations put forward, and primary among key recommendations made is to change the way the government is set to combat terrorism and how it set its priorities (National Commission on Terrorist Attacks report). In part, most of the recommendations are in line with the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism put out in February 2003.
Comparing both the National Commission on Terrorist Attack report to that of the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, there are some key similar policy recommendations reflecting in one and the other. For instance both documents share these issue in tandem, such as combating terrorism, the issues on diplomacy and counter-–proliferation efforts, preemption, intelligence and information assortment, winning minds through diplomacy, and including encouraging more open societies, law enforcement cooperation, combating terrorist financing, and defending the homeland falls mainly into varying categories like preemption aspect of the national strategy on combating terrorism, which has to do with attacking terrorists, preventing the growth of Islamic terrorism by methods that include targeting financial facilitators and funds; protecting against and preparing for attacks; coordination and unity of operational planning, intelligence and sharing of information; enhancing, through centralization, congressional effectiveness of intelligence and counter-terrorism oversight, authorization, and appropriations; centralizing congressional oversight and review of homeland security activities; and increasing FBI, DOD, and DHS capacity to assess terrorist threats and their concomitant response strategies and capabilities (Perl 2004).
And the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks in whole calls for openly confronting problems in the U.S. - Saudi relationship, among others, to include terrorist financing and the billions of dollars as support to a fundamentalist madrasa schools; and on the contrary, sustaining aid to Pakistan and Afghanistan both considered as key strategic war on terror allies in the region (911 Final Report July 22, 2004). In addition, there was a supplemental report issued by the 9/11 Commission that essentially advocated for “Vigorous efforts to track terrorist financing must remain the central priority of the U.S. counter terrorism efforts.
The government has recognized that information about terrorist money helps us to understand their networks, search them out, and disrupt their operations. It continues by saying that intelligence and law enforcement have targeted the relatively small number of financial facilitators–individuals al-Qaeda relied on for their ability to raise and deliver money–at the core of al Qaeda’s revenue stream. According to the Bush Administration, these efforts have worked. The death or capture of several important facilitators has decreased the amount of money available to al Qaeda and has increased its costs and difficulty in raising and moving the money. In addition, captured terrorists have additionally provided an extra intelligence that can be used to continue the cycle of disruption wrote (Ratcliffe 2004).
Nonetheless, before zeroing in to see just how much success the National Terrorism Strategy has scored, it is important to note that page 382 of the National Commission of Terrorism Attacks’ Final Report suggests that “an important principle of targeting terror financing is to gather information on terror network, in addition to raising the costs required to raise funds for use by al Qaeda and others. Moreover, the Report suggests that if al Qaeda is replaced by smaller decentralized groups, the assumption that terrorists need a financial support network may become obsolete, Burton (2006). This paper will not attempt to address the concern as to whether the efforts made so far by the federal government and its allies have actually paid off or not? Based on the 9/11 Commission conclusions that so far, the U. S. Government has made little leeway in deciphering Al Qaeda funding channels and which cited the organization’s ability to adapt quickly and effectively to financial obstacles posted by government activity which in essence suggests the redefining of terrorist financing strategy goals away from a focus on seizing assets and towards a focus on gathering intelligence, (Ratcliffe 2004).
Terrorist Funding Sources
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, government and law enforcement agencies alike were forced to act without having to firstly understand the gravity of the havoc wrecked by the terrorists on American on the one hand, and without the Bush administration having to develop the needed intelligence to go after the bad guys and their funding sources, Emerson (2004). No one would doubt it then that it was the most bizarre and unusual incident since the bombing of Pearl Harbor, even though the government and law enforcement deserve credit for rising to the occasion untiringly to track down assets belonging to terrorists worldwide.
Nonetheless, before zeroing in to see just how much success the National Terrorism Strategy has scored, it is important to note that page 382 of the National Commission of Terrorism Attacks’ Final Report suggests that “an important principle of targeting terror financing is to gather information on terror network, in addition to raising the costs required to raise funds for use by al Qaeda and others. Moreover, the Report suggests that if al Qaeda is replaced by smaller decentralized groups, the assumption that terrorists need a financial support network may become obsolete, Burton (2006). This paper will not attempt to address the concern as to whether the efforts made so far by the federal government and its allies have actually paid off or not? Based on the 9/11 Commission conclusions that so far, the U. S. Government has made little leeway in deciphering Al Qaeda funding channels and which cited the organization’s ability to adapt quickly and effectively to financial obstacles posted by government activity which in essence suggests the redefining of terrorist financing strategy goals away from a focus on seizing assets and towards a focus on gathering intelligence, (Ratcliffe 2004).
Terrorist Funding Sources
In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, government and law enforcement agencies alike were forced to act without having to firstly understand the gravity of the havoc wrecked by the terrorists on American on the one hand, and without the Bush administration having to develop the needed intelligence to go after the bad guys and their funding sources, Emerson (2004). No one would doubt it then that it was the most bizarre and unusual incident since the bombing of Pearl Harbor, even though the government and law enforcement deserve credit for rising to the occasion untiringly to track down assets belonging to terrorists worldwide.
Consistent with the research methodology that the use of “randomized place-based trials in evaluating hot spots that yielded some successful results on how terrorists have raised money to support their dreadful operations including the use of charitable organizations, online based funding, financial and corporate institutions, Weisburd (2004).” Reports on the U.S. Embassies bombings in Tanzania and Kenya offer initial examples on the use of those methods. Using a broad sampling of terrorist organizations, effort will be made to clearly demonstrate the place based theory and the similarity of methods employed by terrorist organizations.
This portion of the paper will look at key participating organizations like al-Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah. Because of the ideal that charity organizations represent, that is help the needy, bringing the people and the world together, correcting the ills of the world, terrorists organizations have been able to covertly support their missions through charitable donations made by charity organizations globally (Emerson 2004). For the United States, primary democratic ideal like the first amendment sticks out when going after charitable organizations no matter the reasons and terrorist organizations exploit this to channel their financial assets.
And every facet of the American democratic value shares some leniency toward charity organizations; for instance, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) would not scrutinize charitable organizations as it would otherwise do for-profit organizations, and especially when most of those same charity organizations have benefitted from tax payers’ dollars through donations and grants from agencies like USAID, Allen & Mufson (2001). For example, the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLFRD) whose assets were frozen for allegedly supporting Hamas was approved to receive USAID supplemental grants made possible through tax payer money (The Washington Post. December 5, 2001). Those efforts made at scrutinizing charity organizations have come under stark criticism on grounds of religious or ethnic profiling, and others, Emerson (2004).
Al-Qaeda at some point has utilized the same strategy of going through charity organizations to transfer funds. For instance, through the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), there are reports which show that many fundamentalist organizations including al-Qaeda have benefitted from lofty donations made by the IIRO, an organization that has been linked by both Canadian and American intelligence operatives to have substantial ties to al-Jihad, and also operating under the name International Relief Organization (IRO), (http://www.arab.net/iiro). Granted that these organizations had perfectly well been operated in the capacity for which they were granted a 501 (3) (C) status, extended by the IRS to institutions that have tax exempt status, but at the hype that immediately followed the 9/11 attacks, and in the quest to understand how the hijackers sustain themselves and their operations, i.e. basic things like food, clothing, shelter, including funds to procure plane tickets, the 9/11 Commission Final Report shows that these men were funded by al-Qaeda through charity organizations mostly those branded as Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT).
This portion of the paper will look at key participating organizations like al-Qaeda, Hamas, and Hezbollah. Because of the ideal that charity organizations represent, that is help the needy, bringing the people and the world together, correcting the ills of the world, terrorists organizations have been able to covertly support their missions through charitable donations made by charity organizations globally (Emerson 2004). For the United States, primary democratic ideal like the first amendment sticks out when going after charitable organizations no matter the reasons and terrorist organizations exploit this to channel their financial assets.
And every facet of the American democratic value shares some leniency toward charity organizations; for instance, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) would not scrutinize charitable organizations as it would otherwise do for-profit organizations, and especially when most of those same charity organizations have benefitted from tax payers’ dollars through donations and grants from agencies like USAID, Allen & Mufson (2001). For example, the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLFRD) whose assets were frozen for allegedly supporting Hamas was approved to receive USAID supplemental grants made possible through tax payer money (The Washington Post. December 5, 2001). Those efforts made at scrutinizing charity organizations have come under stark criticism on grounds of religious or ethnic profiling, and others, Emerson (2004).
Al-Qaeda at some point has utilized the same strategy of going through charity organizations to transfer funds. For instance, through the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO), there are reports which show that many fundamentalist organizations including al-Qaeda have benefitted from lofty donations made by the IIRO, an organization that has been linked by both Canadian and American intelligence operatives to have substantial ties to al-Jihad, and also operating under the name International Relief Organization (IRO), (http://www.arab.net/iiro). Granted that these organizations had perfectly well been operated in the capacity for which they were granted a 501 (3) (C) status, extended by the IRS to institutions that have tax exempt status, but at the hype that immediately followed the 9/11 attacks, and in the quest to understand how the hijackers sustain themselves and their operations, i.e. basic things like food, clothing, shelter, including funds to procure plane tickets, the 9/11 Commission Final Report shows that these men were funded by al-Qaeda through charity organizations mostly those branded as Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT).
Other sources of funding, most significantly have come from the trade of illegal drugs in places like Afghanistan and elsewhere already dealt with in this paper. The 9/11 Commission Final Report also associated these organizations as having to have aided terrorist organizations prior to the 9/11 attacks, “the Wafa Humanitarian Organization, Rabita Trust for the Rehabilitation of Stranded Pakistanis, Qatar Charitable Society, al-Aqsa Educational Fund, Darkazanli Import-Export Company, Barakaat Telecommunications / InterWAVE”, and many others.
Conclusion
One good means to check against the success and setbacks of a piece of policy is through performance indicators, this also enables policy makers to effectively manage the outcomes of the project, which is by retaining those aspects that work and trash out those that are not working (Ratcliffe 2004). Because it is not so easy to measure the successes and failures of the enormous challenges to policy makers though the financing of terror, successful output indicators cannot be measured in emptiness other than from the context of policy goals and objectives; more so when every side of the isle, terrorists and those tasked with the responsibility of combating them, all with a different goals and objectives, Perl (2005). “For instance, success for those charged with securing an airport may be claimed by citing the absence of attacks on the facility and the heavy presence of security personnel and detection technology, and equally so, success for the terrorist network may be claimed because the enemy has expended unnecessary resources protecting a facility that was never targeted for attack, with the aggregate result of such expenditures being less available resources to devote to other counter-terror goals such as combating terrorist financing (Perl 2005),”
Conclusion
One good means to check against the success and setbacks of a piece of policy is through performance indicators, this also enables policy makers to effectively manage the outcomes of the project, which is by retaining those aspects that work and trash out those that are not working (Ratcliffe 2004). Because it is not so easy to measure the successes and failures of the enormous challenges to policy makers though the financing of terror, successful output indicators cannot be measured in emptiness other than from the context of policy goals and objectives; more so when every side of the isle, terrorists and those tasked with the responsibility of combating them, all with a different goals and objectives, Perl (2005). “For instance, success for those charged with securing an airport may be claimed by citing the absence of attacks on the facility and the heavy presence of security personnel and detection technology, and equally so, success for the terrorist network may be claimed because the enemy has expended unnecessary resources protecting a facility that was never targeted for attack, with the aggregate result of such expenditures being less available resources to devote to other counter-terror goals such as combating terrorist financing (Perl 2005),”
Weisburd (2004) argues that a potential consequence of success indicators is overreliance on quantitative data at the expense of its qualitative importance, therefore he cautioned that in order a multi-dimensional metric to qualitatively analyze the degree of success of a strategy designed to address the financing of terror are many. In line with this, (Emerson 2004) makes the claim that practical application of performance metrics poses no small challenge, which he categorizes as assets and funds confiscated, lack of desire of those contributing to the cause(s), inability to fund resulting from the chilling effect of policies on contributions, changes in levels of terrorist recruitment, the number of terrorist operatives apprehended or neutralized, public relations impact on a society of government policies that target terrorist financing, the disruptive effect of policies on terrorist activities and organizational infrastructures, including deterring or slowing down potential attacks, the impact of policies on coalition building, and the impact of policies in curbing other criminal activity—especially activity linked to terrorist groups—such as the illicit drug and arms trade and piracy of intellectual property.
Finally, there remains the intelligence value of policies employed. Clearly here, an important metric is the impact of intelligence gained on directly preventing catastrophic terrorist events which can result into a policy shift based on the realization that a certain policy focus is not attainable, either because it is cost intensive to actually deny terrorists funding in any meaningful way, due to overarching expectations (9/11 Commission Final Report). Secondly, the 9/11 Commission’s final report on many instances mentioned that terrorists increasingly scout for more informal methods of transferring and obtaining funds which makes it tougher for law enforcement agencies to seize a significant amount of money or assets.
This is not to suggest that the amount seized so far is not significant. Page 382 of the 9/11 Commission Report bearing the testimony of the Treasury Undersecretary, Samuel W. Bodman, said as of April 2004 up to $200 million have been intercepted and seized so far. The report concluded that essentially, that as terrorist networks decentralize their operations and presence, there is this likelihood that they may become financially independent making it tougher to track or interdict their assets.
This is not to suggest that the amount seized so far is not significant. Page 382 of the 9/11 Commission Report bearing the testimony of the Treasury Undersecretary, Samuel W. Bodman, said as of April 2004 up to $200 million have been intercepted and seized so far. The report concluded that essentially, that as terrorist networks decentralize their operations and presence, there is this likelihood that they may become financially independent making it tougher to track or interdict their assets.
These sorts of conclusions were reached during the war on drugs concerning interdiction efforts targeting the assets generated from the drug trade. It is very difficult to say whether or not the theory of stifling terrorist assets denies terrorists of becoming inoperable in that the 9/11 Commission Report did not suggest whether going after terrorist assets may prove useful as a coalition building tool; or may have a terrifying effect on donations to terrorist organizations, resulting to a little or no recruitment of unknown sympathizers. The need to train other coalition countries engaged in the war on terror to improve their judicial and regulatory manpower resources to make them equally sophisticated like the U.S. was also not discussed in the report.
Reference
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Terrorist attacks kill 90 wound hundreds at Sharm el - Sheikh ...
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