ABSTRACT

An analysis of factors influencing participation in al Qaeda-styled terrorism in the United States since 9/11:

A Mixed Methodology Inquiry

by

Edmond R. Gray

Dissertation Proposal for Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for The Degree of

Doctor of Philosophy

Criminal Justice

Walden University

Excerpt of the study

ABSTRACT

Terrorism research posits some methodological challenges and difficulties, more so in accessing data and application of traditional research methodologies. This study draws upon others to close the information gap created by these challenges. It takes into account, Americans who have committed crimes that are defined under various federal statutes, such as providing material support to designated terrorist organizations, joined or attempted to join one or more jihadist groups abroad, or plotted to attack American interests within the United States or abroad. The study investigates how and why people decide to facilitate al Qaeda-styled jihadist missions against the United States. Understanding what influences participation in terrorism and forms of recruitment are valuable means of thwarting future terrorist plots. Therefore, in an effort to inform public policy, this study analyzes the means of recruitment and factors influencing participation in homegrown terrorism since 2001. Both qualitative and quantitative factor analyses are used in this study to evaluate a set of data extracted from RAND (N=100) and WITS (N=35). The subject in this study is multistate and includes homegrown al Qaeda-styled terrorists. Population sampling is non-probability or convenience, selected from a list of 176 terrorists found to have been involved in 47 homegrown plots against the United States. The qualitative aspect looks at key motivational and enabling factors influencing participation in homegrown terrorism. The quantitative aspect on the other hand, generates data using SPSS (19.0), for statistical analysis of participants in al Qaeda-styled terrorism and main characteristics, organizational learning factors, and motivational and enabling factors.

CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW

INTRODUCTION

Chapter two evaluates the in-depth conceptualization of homegrown terrorism, along with the difficulties and limitations over the years of establishing a precise definition for terrorism. The chapter also provides a concise description of Al-Qaeda style terrorism and its historical development in the United States. Additionally, this chapter highlighted key homegrown terrorism cases and sources in the United States between 9/11 straight through December of 2011. Conceptually, not only is terrorism a very difficult subject to study, it cannot be researched in isolation (Badey, 1998; McCormick, 2003). Though it may have attracted a large number of scholars from various fields, there is not a consistently coherent definition of terrorism. Therefore, adapting a common analytical definition of terrorism has proven elusive (Silke, 2001).
     So far, U.S. counterterrorism policy makers have had mixed successes in contextualizing jihadist terrorism, especially since 9/11 (Schmid & Jongman, 1988; Cooper, 2001; Scharf, 2004; Weinberg, Pedahzur, & Hirsch-Hoefler, 2004). Nevertheless, the effort to have a unified definition of terrorism is ongoing. As a result, there are definitional differences on every important component of the subject, including the distinction between terrorism and other aspects of political violence. The main problem is finding an embracing definition that could be generally accepted at all levels (Cooper, 2004, p. 883). Moreover, policy makers, experts, governments, federal, state, and local U.S. agencies, including the FBI, have defined terrorism within their individual scope of experience (Crenshaw, 1992; Hoffman, 2006; Martin, 2006; Smith, 1994; White, 2006).
Furthermore, there is disagreement as to whether terrorism is a political, social, or psychological field. For instance, a number of definitions emphasized the ‘political’ nature of the term (Enders & Sandler, 2006; Hoffman, 2006; Laqueur, 1987; Turk, 1982); while others focused on the targets (e.g., Enders & Sandler, 2006, p. 3; Gibbs, 1989, p. 330). But, as observed by (Smith, 1994), these discussions, have yet to produce a commonly acceptable definition on the subject. Regardless where the emphasis of defining terrorism lies, the debate over the nature and scope of terrorism will continue into the foreseeable future. For instance, Schmid and Jongman (1988) identified some 109 ways to define terrorism. As a result, they described terrorism as “an anxiety-driven means of continued act of violence clandestinely used by non-state or state actors, for political, criminal and personal reasons. Whereby, the affected targets may not be the actual target or target of opportunity. Moreover, terrorist randomly or selectively choose their target population through whom they disseminate their messages.”  
     Howbeit the trend of the definitional debate, the important distinction is whether terrorism should be defined from its political or criminal context. For the purpose of this study, only a few of these definitions will be evaluated. At the top of these terrorism definitions is the classic description by Thornton (1964), which states that, “terrorism is the systematic use of violence or threat against noncombat parties for political reasons. “This definition of terrorism postulates it more or less as an act.” But, due to its psychological nature, Sauter and Carafano, (2005) argues that, “defining terrorism as an act only distinguishes it from other forms of violence.” Accordingly, and by definition, terrorist actions are planned to influence one target at the expense of another. Thus, terrorism is an act used by sub-national or non-state actors to randomly target noncombat victims, mostly directed at a small sector of the population to create fear within the larger society (p. 66).

Martin (2006, p. 47), argues that “regardless whether the overarching reasons are ideologically, religiously, politically or criminally based, terrorism is used as a coercion tool against governments or an entire population to seek attention. For instance, some studies have defined terrorism as a deliberate act, done in honor of a bigger cause (Hoffman, 1998; Rapoport, 1992, 1999). But, differences exist in defining terrorist, terrorist organizations, and terrorist actions. In essence, these inconsistencies could create additional difficulties in researching terrorism as well as developing effective counterterrorism strategies. Additionally, Silke (2004a) noted that the lack of a commonly accepted definition stifles uniform data collection, lessens the number of reliable findings, and makes scientific studies on terrorism questionably vague.[1] 
     More importantly, the lack of a concisely clear definition of terrorism poses additional confusions in understanding factors influencing people to choose terrorism among alternatives, how are actions of terrorist organizations justified, what is the nature of terrorist ideological beliefs, whether or not the actions of terrorists are influenced by external or internal dynamics (DeNardo, 1985, p. 242). Therefore, a common definition helps in developing evenhanded national and international cooperation and laws on punishments, discouragement of state sponsorship of terrorism, getting adequate federal assistance for counterterrorism efforts, and enhancing public relations, Sezgin (2007).

      Although a number of proactive steps have been adopted since 9/11, to ensure uniformity among state-state and international cooperation in the fight against terrorism, those efforts have not reached the level where they can be used as best practices. For example, while the United States and United Kingdom may have a common definition for jihadist terrorism, both countries have an individual list of terrorists, domestic and foreign that is totally different from the other (Silber & Bhatt, 2007). Hence, such inconsistencies could impede the efforts to fight terrorism globally, create lapses among local security entities, or encourage sympathy for terrorist organizations. Furthermore, the U.S. Terrorism Report (2002-2005) listed thirteen (13) terrorist groups that are active both in the United States and United Kingdom. On the contrary, the report listed fifteen (15) other terrorist organizations that are not on the UK list of active terrorist organizations, and eight (8) others on the United Kingdom list of terrorists that are not on the U.S. list. These inconsistencies could result into terrorist organizations setting up clandestine or sleeper shops in communities where they could operate without detection (Silke, 2004a).

      Even within the U. S. Homeland Security apparatus, there are limitations and collaborative disadvantages among local intelligence stemming from disparities in the definition of terrorism (Rascoff, 2010). Accordingly, local intelligence authorities do not possess the ability to fully utilize their institutional strengths agencies in collecting and analyzing data. For instance, the U. S. State Department defines terrorism from its premeditated nature, a definition that is not constituted in the FBI’s definition. Nonetheless, the FBI views terrorism from its psychological perspective, which is not factored into the U. S. State Department’s definition of terrorism. Moreover, the U. S. State Department primary interest is with noncombat terrorist targets, as opposed to the FBI’s wider border concerns, which include governments, civil population and infrastructures. 

 Bjelopera (2010) defined terrorism[2] as “an act of violence or plot carried out within the United States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors who became radicalized in the United States. Consequently, the meaning of homegrown terrorism does signify, what is broadly categorized as domestic terrorism, such as the Oklahoma City Bombing, Beutel (2007). Due to the attacks of 9/11 and coupled with the subsequent military involvements of the United States in Afghanistan, Iraq, and others, the meaning of homegrown terrorism now includes, jihadist attacks carried out by American or European born citizens of Muslim dissent or converted Muslims; legal permanent residents; and people who have lived extensively in Europe or the United States. Regardless what precipitated their actions, domestic terrorists may operate under no central command, Silber and Bhatt (2007, p. 17).

      However, this study defines homegrown or an Al Qaeda styled terrorism in accordance with the U. S. House of Congressional Committee on Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorist Prevention Act of 2007. Accordingly, “terrorism is the process of embracing and extremely violent ideological belief with the intention of promoting a political, social, or religious agenda. Whereas, homegrown terrorism is the use, planned use, or threatened use of force or violence by a group or people born, raised, or based and purposefully operating in the United States or any U.S. possession, with the sole aim of intimidating or coercing the government and people of United States, or interest to foster a political, social, or religious goal. And ideological based violence pertains the use, planned use, or threatened use of force or violence by a group or individual to promote group or individual political, social, or religious beliefs,” (Sedgwick, 2010).   

      The rest of this chapter will analyze the evolution of domestic terrorism in the United States to understand the decision making process of terrorists. Understanding the criteria and environmental context of terrorism will help to understand what influences terrorism (DeNardo, 1985, p. 242). A review of the literature on the contextual definition of terrorism identified a very important characteristic between the preconditions, which establish the basis of terrorist activity and the preconditions that better explain causes of violence (e.g., Eckstein, 1965; Johnson, 1966). Therefore, the conditions for terrorist to carry out attacks must be tactical or permissively conducive (Crenshaw, 1981; Weinberg & Davis, 1989). Accordingly, understanding these permissive conditions[3] under which terrorist organizations flourish will shed light on the emergence, evolvement, and devolvement of terrorist organizations over time. Therefore, within this context, terrorism then becomes a matter of choice. Hence, the conditions that lead people to choose terrorism in the midst of other nonviolent choices are the points of discussion of this study. 

 Evolution of Homegrown Terrorism in the United States

     In order to understand what influences people to support terrorism one must first seek to understand the nature of terrorism. Nevertheless, the nature of terrorism has dramatically changed since the 1970s. According to Yilmaz (2009), “today’s terrorists have an array of technical skills ranging from piloting aircraft to creating the most sophisticated bombs.” Besides, the availability of inexpensive explosives has made conducting deadly terrorist attacks an effortless technical venture. Hence, today, terrorist organizations are capable of plotting inexpensively highly sophisticated attacks with the help of suicide bombers.  
     U.S. domestic terrorist threat today consists of small plots and do-it-yourself or single gunmen attacks. Occasionally, there will be more attempted attacks and bloodsheds. Therefore, prevention is not always bound to work, nor does the reduction of the spread of jihadist terrorism takes only improved intelligence, watchful citizens, and the cooperation of close associates and family members of those who are at risk of becoming terrorists (Vindino, 2009). The argument is made by Jenkins (2010), that “blending proactive counterterrorism investigative measures with public reaction will enhance national defense.” Moreover, Jenkins (2010) stated that “by amplifying the threat of terrorism, raising pointless alarm, promoting the idealistic expectations of a society completely free from terrorist threat, and the complex demands for total protection, only emboldens the fundamental beliefs of terrorists, which have to do with creating widespread fear, attracting extensive media coverage, harass, weaken, or embarrass government security forces so that the government overreacts and appears repressive.” As long as the United States continues to appear psychologically vulnerable to terrorism, jihadists will capitalize on such weakness as a strong recruitment tool (9/11 REPORT).  

While the recruitment of Somalis within the United States by al-Shabaab of Somalia was alarming, recruitment in the diaspora is an old exercise in America, Morrison (2011). Accordingly, the nature of terrorism in the United States between the late 1960s and 1980s originated from international crises. For instance, the early rebellious campaigns against the regime of Fidel Castrol by Cuban exiles in the United, which lasted well into the 1970s, were fueled by stories of wars told to them by their fathers and uncles. In their quest to force Turkey to admit and take responsibility for the 1915 massacre of Americans by the Ottoman Empire, latter generation Armenian-Americans were driven to attack representatives of the Turkey government in the seventies and eighties.
      Similarly, Gartenstein-Ross and Grossman (2009) found that, despite its mistrust of American volunteers, The Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) enjoyed massive financial support from Irish-Americans towards its cause. But, there was a decline after support by Irish-American for IRA was outlawed in the United States. In outlining the history of homegrown networks inspired by radical Islam operating in the United States, Vidino (2009) claims that, the endless campaigns of violence by Puerto Rican separatists on the U.S. mainland; the targeting of Yugoslav officials in the United States by local Croat separatists for what they considered domination by Southern Slavs; and the attacks on Soviet and Arab interests in the United States by some elements of the Jewish Defense League, mark the watershed of homegrown terrorism in the United States.”

 Most pre-9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States were not directed at the general public, but against foreign nations doing business with the United States and its allies, such as Turkey, Yugoslavia, Cuba, Arab States, and others (Vidino, 2009). As a result, terrorist related deaths in the United States during the 1970s far exceeded the decade following 9/11, even though very few attacks were considered large-scale (p. 10). Efforts to compare terrorist generations of Americans showed that too many generations of early Americans participated in foreign wars, for reasons ranging from civil disobedience, ideology, faith, and individual conscience (Silver & Bhatt, 2007; Sageman, 2008; Schanzer, Kurzman, & Moosa, 2010).

      For instance, during the 1940s, many American World War II veterans joined an all-volunteer army to fight and defend Israel’s early wars for independence, Morris (2008, p. 85). A decade or so earlier, thousands of Americans traveled abroad to help fight the Spanish ideological Civil War of the1930s (Beevor, 2006; Paz, 2011). Unlike the Spanish Civil War, Americans were inspired by religious and national overtures to join the Greek Army in the first Balkan Wars of 1912 (Erickson, 2003, p. 40). Although the number of Americans who participated in these foreign wars latter became the targets of extensive crackdowns for allegedly being sympathizers of communism in the United States, these causes were very popular then, Schrecker (1994). Moreover, the United States has not only been a land that attracts widespread support for foreign conflicts, but one that is equally rife for local recruitment (Bellamy, 2003).[4] For instance, because it was not declared a foreign terrorist group till 2008, it is unprecedentedly not surprising for al-Shabaab to have easily raised funds and recruited waves of young Somalis within the United States (Jenkins, 2011, p. 14). 

 Ideological Definition and Al-Qaeda Styled Terrorism in the United States

     The name Al-Qaeda, which is also spelled al-Qaida, al-Qa`ida, or al-Qa `idah, is defined as an international Sunni Islamic movement founded in 1988. Accordingly, Al-Qaeda have carried out attacks against civilian and military targets in a number of countries, the most notable being the 9/11 attacks Understanding the emergence of al Qaeda styled terrorism in the United States entails basic historical knowledge of all U.S. related jihadist activities before and after 9/11 (Badey, 1998). This study has chronologically listed the number of al Qaeda styled terrorist plots between 9/11 and 2011. In addition, there is need to clearly define some of the terms that will be used in this analysis before attempting to analyze the emergence of homegrown terrorism in the United States. Homegrown terrorist network typically consists of people residing, born in the United States, or elsewhere (generational Muslim immigrants/or converts) who became radicalized to the teachings of Islam and operating independently or as a cluster group (Khatchadourian, 2007). Subsequently, the meaning of “homegrown terrorist” has largely emphasized forms of radicalization, than an individual’s place of birth, Vidino (2007, p.3). 
      This study attempts to describe Al-Qaeda styled terrorism over the last decade, including out of network operatives also referred to as ‘lone wolves.’ According to Barnes (2012), lone wolves are individuals acting in isolation to orchestrate violent acts outside a structured chain of command in the interest of a terror group or radical cause. In the decades leading from 9/11, the United States experienced a number of lone wolf cases (Chermak, & Freilich, 2010). On the other hand, literature on terrorism deals extensively with an array of definition and conceptualizations of terrorism. But, despite the growing interest in terrorism study, there is no precise or distinctive definition for terrorism (Sageman, 2008).

      For the purpose of this study, an Al-Qaeda styled “terrorist attack” is defined operationally, as any armed attack carried out by an individual or group with link to al Qaeda (Bjelopera, 2011). Accordingly, the term ‘jihadist’ refers mostly to radicals who justify their actions as ideologically or religiously based Islamic principles. But, the term ‘jihadist’ as used by civil and religious Muslim leaders or caliphs, mostly applies to ‘violent jihadists,’ meaning people who support, plot, or directly partake in violent terrorist activities, Schanzer, Kurzman, and Moosa (2010). The focus of this analysis is on “violent extremism,” which is synonymous to “violent jihadist” and “jihadist terrorist.” The use of these phrases is to distinguish the transition from simply believing to pursuing jihadist principles through illegal or violent means.  The transitioning from believing to pursuing jihadist missions through violent methods and becoming fully radicalized to terrorism, vary from person to person (Wiktorowicz, 2005).

      As previously stated, there is officially, no working definition for homegrown terrorism,  and the categorization of violent jihadist or al Qaeda styled terrorist activity since 9/11 (Mills & Clarke, 2011). But, al Qaeda styled terrorist activities are classified into: successful missions undertaken by one-man or lone wolves, lack of will by plotters to undertake suicide or martyrdom missions, diverse endgame tactics, and broad capabilities (Bjelopera, 2011, p.2). Accordingly, the fight against al Qaeda styled terrorism in the United States takes into account, how people become radicalized from the open marketplace of ideas; proactive counterterrorism measures used to dismantle both open and secretive illegal jihadist plots; and the effectiveness of counterterrorism strategies used to foil terrorist plots.

      As reported in the 9/11 Final Report, the growth of homegrown or Post 9/11 Al-Qaeda styled terrorism in the United States, goes as far back as the early 1990, when a number of people left the United States for jihad missions abroad. For instance, in New York, the Masjid al Farooq Mosque, headed then by a blind Sheik, was significant in the formation of al Khifa, an Al-Qaeda affiliated terrorist network that was established by the founder of Al Qaeda, Abdullah Azzam (9/11 Final Report, 2004). Al Khifa and other primary Islamic networks served as key feeder and financial source for the Afghan jihad and many global Islamic struggles at the end of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. In addition to branches in Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, Pittsburgh, and Tucson, Al Qaeda styled jihadist influences were spread throughout the United States via Al Khifa (p. 58).

      Up till the U. S. military engagement with the Taliban in 2001, some 400 American Muslims and non-American residents had participated in the Afghan and Pakistani jihad training schemes (Lia, 2008).” Accordingly, Robert Blitzer, a former counterterrorism official of the Federal Bureau of Investigation estimated that between 1,000 and 2,000 jihadist volunteers travelled from the United States to participate in various worldwide jihadist trainings or wars. One noted example of Islamic coverts that fought in an Afghan war as a jihadist, is convicted and so-named American Taliban, John Walker Lindh (Mayer, 2008; USDC, 2002). Other American Muslim converts, who made jihad trips to Pakistan and Afghanistan, included Ohio native Christopher Paul, who up till his indictment in 2007 for his role in plotting against Americans and American interests abroad, visited several jihad training camps after joining Al Qaeda in 1991(USDC, 2007); similarly, New Jersey native of Puerto Rican descent and less known, Hiram Torres who changed his name to Mohammed Salman after embracing Islam, was a Yale University freshman when he traveled abroad to fight with the Pakistani jihadist group, Harkat ul-Mujahedeen, Rhode and Risen (2002).

      Consequently, Torres was among the first group of Hispanic-American jihadists influenced by radical Islam; also of Hispanic origin is Jose Padilla, a well know jihadist with the Islamic name Abdullah al Muhajir of New York; due to Padilla’s bomb making experience from a training he received at Al Qaeda safe house in Lahore, Pakistan in 2002, he was initially accused of wanting to mastermind a “dirty bomb” attack within the United States (Goodnough, 2007). But, unlike Torres who seemed to have been a lone wolf, Padilla was part of an established American-based jihadist network, Drogin, Meyer, and Lichtblau (2002). Consequently, during Padilla’s arrest in Lahore, Pakistan, a number of other top jihadists were also arrested in other parts of Pakistan following a prolonged shootout in Faisalabad, amongst which was Abu Zubeida, Al Qaeda’s chief of operations. Consistent with a press release from the U.S. Department of Justice dated January 22, 2008, during his conviction in 2007 for supporting terrorism, Padilla and two others, Kifah Wael Jayousi and Adham Amin Hassoun were also sentenced for their roles in a South Florida jihadist network, which facilitated jihad missions worldwide.

      Also linked to the South Florida network, was a small but very important jihadist cell stationed in La Jolla, San Diego, which operated three charitable organizations, American Islamic Group, Islamic Center of the Americas, and Save Bosnia Now (Rosin, 2001; Simpson, 2002). Consistent with a U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation unclassified reports (2002-2005), Aukai Collins is a one-legged amputee jihadist from Hawaii, who fought in Kashmir and Chechnya, and had embraced Islam in San Diego. The FBI report also listed Mohammed Zaky as an American born jihadist with Egyptian dissent who was killed while leading a jihadist group in the Chechnya-Russian war in 1995.

Accordingly, Zaky was the only listed American in that war. The New York, San Diego and Florida jihadist networks were few examples of Al Qaeda styled terrorist links in the United States before 9/11. But, Waxman (2008, p. 380) listed the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, the Oklahoma City bombing, and the series of attacks by the “Unabomber” Theodore Kaczynski as the events behind the waves of criminal statutes against jihadist styled terrorist activities by local state authorities, which mirrored federal criminal laws (p. 381).
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However, according to the 9/11 Commission Report, the number of organizations and individuals linked to Al Qaeda styled terrorism in the United States grew significantly after the 9/11 attacks, particularly among first time supporters or sympathizers of jihadist causes. Similarly, the number of Americans who embraced Islam for the first time also grew dramatically during the start of the U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Consequently, U. S. counterterrorism measures significantly shifted when increased attention was paid to all jihadist networks, including those that may not have otherwise been considered significant before 9/11 attacks (Carafano, 2007). Even though the bulk of those captured in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, were mostly foreign terrorists, the adoption by U.S. law enforcement authorities of a proactive counterterrorism measure that included a broad spectrum of the American society, many jihadist cells with distinct Al Qaeda styled characteristics were uncovered (Waxman, 2008). Based on a National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States Commission Report, many states did not prioritize terrorism at any levels of government up till 9/11. For the most part, terrorism was largely a secondary duty of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (p. 74)

Even though the first batch of captured terrorists in the United States after 9/11 consisted mostly foreign jihadists, the indication from a research conducted by the Pew Center in May 22, 2007 revealed that a higher number of American born jihadists were also arrested on Al Qaeda styled terrorism offences. For instance, on September 2002, six American men of Yemeni descent from the Buffalo suburb of Lackawanna, New York, were indicted for allegedly participating in Al Qaeda sponsored training schemes in Al Faroq, Afghanistan in the summer of 2001 (Aziz & Lam, 2003). One month following their sentences, a group of American Muslims originally known as the Portland Six were charged in October 2002 by a federal grand jury in Portland, Oregon for allegedly facilitating Taliban and Al Qaeda causes (Chesney, 2005).

In similar circumstances, nearly one week after 9/11, federal authorities raided a Detroit apartment where they arrested four immigrants of Moroccan and Algerian descents, and confiscated video footage of Disneyland and other sketches depicting strategic vital U. S. installations, such as U.S. air base in Turkey and military hospital located in Jordan (Johnson, 2011). Accordingly, in May 2010, Pakistani born Faisal Shehzad attempted to bomb New York Time Square with a car full of explosive. Moreover, Shehzad was inspired mainly by Pakistani militants coupled with the radical advocacy of cleric Anwar al-Awlaki (para. 11). One of the most outstanding Al Qaeda styled terrorist incidents, is that of Major Nidal Hassan, the “Virginia-born Muslim and career military psychiatrist who shot and killed thirteen people and wounded over thirty others on November 5, 2009 at his work site of Fort Hood Army base (McKinley & Dao, 2009).” Like Shehzad, Major Hassan was inspired from frequent lectures offered by Anwar al-Awlaki. Through a twenty-one email exchange with Awlaki, Hassan wanted to know the Islamic laws surrounding Muslim-American soldiers killing fellow soldiers. Besides, prior to the Fort Hood massacre, Hassan is said to have constantly questioned the moral justifications of the U.S wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; at some point had unsuccessfully attempted to get out of the army (para. 6).

     The Fort Hood incident by Major Nidal Hassan was not the only post 9/11 attempt to take jihadist style attack to a U.S. military installation within the United States. For instance, though they were not found by law enforcement authorities to have ties to international jihadist groups such as Al Qaeda, five of six foreign born-Muslims were caught and convicted for plotting to carry out a jihadist style attack on the Fort Dix Army base in New Jersey in 2007 (Temple-Raston,  2007). Of the almost seventy cases targeting U.S. military installations or personnel within the United States and abroad, over half of them included plans to carry out jihadist styled attacks against U.S. military bases or personnel serving abroad (Bjelopera & Randol, 2010). Including the Fort Hood attack, the number of deadly jihadist terrorist plots on American soil from 2001 to 2011 is Seventeen (p. 25).

Table 1: U.S. homegrown terrorism cases 9/11-2010 (Adapted from Jenkins, 2010)

Year	Number of Cases	Number of Individuals
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011	6          6        11          5          9          6          4        15        20          8	6  6                    12                    15                    26                    11                      4                     40                     31                     13

Table 2: Terrorist profiles and training schemes (Adapted from Bjelopera, 2011).

Plots or Jihadists		Number of Cases-Year	Lone Wolf In Bold		Thwarted Terrorist Plots 2001-2011	Converted Trained Overseas
Alessa & Almonte Al-Shabaab Colleen LaRose Faisal Shahzad Jehad Mostafa Northern Virginia Five Omar Hammami Shaker Masri The Rockwoods Zachary Chesser Ft Hood (Nidal Hassan)*** Daniel Boyd, et al		13 Cases   in 2011  31 Cases in    13 Cases in           2010              2011	Lone Wolf Highlighted in  Bold Font and Asterisk		50 Terrorist Plots Against the United States Foiled between 9/11, 2001 and 2011	30 Jihads Sought Training Overseas
David Headley Hosam Smadi Michael Finton Najibullah Zazi Tarek Mehanna Abdulhakim Muhammad*** Newburgh Four		40 Cases in     2009
Bryant Neal Vinas JFK Airport Pipeline Plot Fort Dix six Daniel Maldonado Derrick Shareef Houston Taliban Plot Liberty City Seven Mohammed Taheri-Azar*** Sadequee and Ahmed Toledo, Ohio Plotters JIS Plotting in So. California Lodi Case (the Hayats) Albany Plot New York City Subway Plot Lyman Faris Ahmed Omar Abu Ali Virginia Jihad Hasan Akbar*** Lackawanna Six Jose Padilla Portland Seven		80 Cases Between September 11, 2001 and December 2008	Lone Wolf Highlighted in Bold Font and Asterisk		42 of the 50 Plots against the United States between 9/11, 2001 and 2011 could be deemed homegrown terrorists	22 Converted to Islam

Notes: a. Listed in chronological order. The four attacks are highlighted in bold and Italics.

     

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[1] The lack of a uniformly accepted definition of terrorism does not only impact data collection, it lessens the number of reliable findings, and thereby making the scientific study of terrorism questionably vague (Silke, 2004a). The lack of a common definition of terrorism also presents difficulties in understanding factors influencing terrorism (DeNardo, 1985, p. 242).

[2] Bjelopera (2010) defines homegrown terrorism as an act of violence or plot carried out within the United States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents, or those visitors who became radicalized in the United States. For the purpose of this study, terrorism is defined in line with the U.S. Congressional Committee on Violent Radicalization and Homegrown Terrorist Prevention Act of 2007. At such, the definition encompasses acting violently, but embracing extremist ideological beliefs. Hence, it is the use, planned use, or threatened use of force or violence by an individual or group of people with ties to the United States.

[3] In line with the rational choice theory, certain conditions must be permissive in order to participate in terrorism (Crenshaw, 1981). Therefore, if an individual chooses to participate in terrorism for financial or economic reasons, when there are other nonviolent options, such a decision is considered rational. By understanding those tactical or permissive conditions that make terrorism possible will help to clarify what influences people to participate in terrorism.

[4] Bellamy (2003) holds that, because of its democratic principles, people are free to exercise their freedoms, including the right to support foreign conflicts. For instance, before it was officially declared a terrorist organization, Al-Shabaab did not only raise millions of dollars in the United States, but recruited a number of young Somali nationals or Americans with ties to Somalia to fight in the Somali Civil War (Jenkins, 2011, p. 14).