Electing Ben Urey is only a reincarnation of Charles Taylor’s Criminal Network

Prior to the end of its operations in March 31, 2006, The Coalition for International Justice (CIJ) served as a global based non-profit organization, with offices in Washington D.C. and The Hague.  Accordingly, CIJ assisted the international war crimes tribunals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia (CIJ, 2006).

CIJ was also instrumental in the transition of justice in East Timor, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Cambodia, and The Sudan.  In its advocacy campaigns, CIJ conducted public education campaigns that targeted mostly U.S. Decision makers in Washington, other capitals, international and local media, and the public. Advocates of CIJ provided expert technical, legal, and outreach assistance on cases before the International Court of Justice (See Farah, 2004).

However, in Liberia, CIJ carried out extensive investigation on the financial network of ex-president Charles Taylor, going as far back as 1990. The reason for the investigation was to determine the level of threat posed by Mr. Taylor’s financial network on the peace and security of Liberia, the sub-region, and the world at large (Farah, 2004, p. 20).  

So, the aim of this analysis is to further demonstrate, that despite his incarceration, Mr. Taylor continues to exert his influence on Liberia through his financial network, which is currently under the tutelage of Benoni Urey.  Based on a Wikileaks’ revelation to the Daily Telegraph of London, the speculated wealth of Mr. Taylor is about $400 million (Hope, 2011).

Mr. Taylor partly derived his financial resources from being warlord, as president, and investment made since 2003 (Grant, 2007). Accordingly, before becoming president in 1997, CIJ found that Mr. Taylor had access to an annual income of over U$75 million. Subsequently, upon becoming president in 1997, that income grew sharply to about $105 million annually till the end of his presidency in August of 2003.

Consequently, Mr. Taylor got the bulk of his personal wealth from spoliation of diamonds (blood diamonds), timber, imposition of private taxes on gasoline and rice importation, rubber, coffee, and rice production (CIJ, 2005). In view of this, Mr. Taylor drew freely from the Liberian nation’s coffers or treasury, thereby putting his annual income much higher. He is estimated to have made between 105-685 million dollars between 1992 and 2003 (CIJ 2005, p. 1). 

But, most of this wealth was spent on massive purchases of weapons, payments of mercenaries or soldiers of fortune, proxy armies, estimated at about $70-80 million annually (CIJ 2005, p.11). However, the rest of Mr. Taylor’s financial network remains under the control of Mr. Urey and seemingly banked in Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, France, Italy, Liechtenstein, Switzerland, Panama, and the Caribbean. U.S. Law Enforcement along with its European counterparts suspected that Mr. Taylor operated at least some thirty companies to hide his asset then (See Farah, n.d., para. 6).

According to a U.N. Panel of Experts on Liberia Report to the Security Council dated October 26, 2001, Mr. Taylor’s assets remain in ongoing investments in Liberia, including Lone Star (Farah, 2004). Jacques Klein, a U.S. Justice official testified in 2005, that “tracing what’s left of Mr. Taylor assets is tedious.” The fact remains, that Mr. Taylor’s business transactions were or are clandestinely held by other businesses with local and offshore corporations with entrant shareholder. Taylor is also credited for using aliases and fake identities, which prevents his name from appearing on all former transactions (See IRIN New, 3 May 2005). In spite of that, investigators were able to linked Mr. Urey as the primary manager of Mr. Taylor’s wealth through Lonestar Cell MTN (see also CIJ, 2005, p. 12). Besides, Mr. Taylor’s illicit financial network mostly used to facilitate his shadow commercial scheme, and now taken over by Urey, has far reaching national and international implications for our fragile peace.  

As opposed to the legal parallel trade under Mrs. Johnson-Sirleaf, a typical President Urey’s economy will firstly foster the shadowy financial network of Mr. Taylor. Duffield (2000, p. 84) argues that, shadowy networks such as Urey’s inherited financial empire, may pretend to be local, while thinking globally.

Subsequently, Reno (2000, p. 58) found that, Mr. Taylor’s empire that is now inherited by Mr. Urey, largely focused on its global connections. For instance, Mr. Taylor used companies throughout the world that pretended to invest in Liberia’s natural resources and other sectors, but facilitated a number of smuggling operations, such as “illicit contrabands, narcotics and weapons (CIJ, 2005, p. 3).” Accordingly, Taylor also maintained a strong grip of the profits earned from government backed subsidies.

More so, Shelley (2005, p. 103) raised some important arguments about “shadow commerce.” On the one hand, the analysis argues that, “the absence of agencies that can enforce an autonomous notion of legality, generates opportunities for politicians to use more innovative means to control natural resources and translate them into political tools.” Secondly, under Mr. Taylor’s network in Liberia, alliances were forged with terrorist entities owing to the lack of inefficient, nonexistent or corrupt law enforcement agencies and governments. It can be noted that, Mr. Urey’s business activities are manned by former forces of the NPFL under the tutelage of Saah Gbolie.

Additionally, if elected president, Mr. Urey will take over control of our Liberian borders, once used as undetected smuggling routes by Mr. Taylor and his chain of international rogue partners. In addition, Campbell (2000, 64) states that, under Mr. Taylor, Liberia was not only used as a smuggling corridor, it provided Liberian corporate profiles instantly with the need to list officers, owners, shareholders, etc.

Campbell (2000) further found, that these types of systems are rife to shadow rogue entities seeking to shelter aircraft from inspection. So, once an airplane was registered in Liberia, regardless where it is stationed globally, there is hardly any evident of its travels” (Ibid.). Under Mr. Taylor, this proved extremely useful for Viktor Bout who was the owner of many airlines and aircrafts to easily register them and thwart regulators (p. 65).

Further, Shelley (2005, p. 104) found that, international terrorist organizations like ISIS and Al-Qaeda seek partnerships with rogue entities that are not only motivated by spoils, but total access to criminal gangs that are open to fight as mercenaries in foreign wars. In Liberia, the entire regime of Mr. Taylor was the crime group whose primary focus was enhancing his shadow economy. And of course, this criminal enterprise is all under the control of Mr. Urey (p. 105).

Others may want to question the possibility that Mr. Taylor yields any influence over Liberia at all with his incarceration in London. But, this won’t be the only time Mr. Taylor has regulated power in Liberia from a distance. For instance, an investigation by the Coalition of International Justice found in 2005 that, Mr. Taylor directed monies from his asylum base in Calabar, Nigeria designed to influence outcomes in Liberia (CIJ, 2005, p. 3-4). However, Mr. Taylor’s sentence somehow obstructed his ability to influence situations in Liberia and elsewhere.

Notwithstanding, the investigation also found that, some of Mr. Taylor’s wealth was used to sponsor at least nine of the parties that participated in the October 2005 presidential (see CIJ Report, 2005; The New Republic, 2005/4/25). More frightening, these investigations found strong evidence that Mr. Taylor’s influence has included the funding of violent demonstrations in Monrovia in October 2004. For a full discussion of Mr. Taylor’s influence over Liberia, please see Jacques Klein’s testimony to U.S. House of Congress in 2005.  

On the hand, the CIJ (2005) report further named Emmanuel Shaw as another of former Taylor’s associates, managing his financial network through PLC Investment Limited. “Shaw also held investments at the Robertsfield International airport, owning the hangers at Liberia’s only international airport prior to 2005.”

Shaw was the primary contact person for a series of illegal weapons shipments from Serbia. Accordingly, it was he met the airplanes carrying weapons merchants who illegally imported tons of weapons into Liberia, escorted the weapons dealers and received gifts from them. He also leased two aircraft, both Boeing 727-200s (registrations YU-AKD and YU-AKM) from the weapons merchants. These aircraft were used to fly weapons from Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso to Liberia from November 2002 through February 2003.

As the U.N investigating panel noted, “the range and capacity of these aircraft are ideal for rapid shipment of light weapons and ammunition and these aircraft could have dual use as revenue generator with passenger traffic and arms transporter when necessary.” For a list of all former Taylor’s associates, see CIJ (2005) endnotes.

On the other hand, Mr. Taylor’s financial network included Mr. Urey’s role in the siphoning of funds from the Liberian International Shipping and Corporate Registry (LISCR), partly used to purchase weapons. Mr. Urey also helped to manage the Taylor-controlled Lone Star Communications, served as primary liaison for the illegal purchase of weapons from the Russian arms dealer Viktor Bout (see CIJ 2005, p. 23).

Accordingly, “Bout had two important assets that set him apart from other traffickers: a private fleet of about 50 aging Russian-made aircraft, acquired as the Soviet bloc crumbled, and the ability to procure not only weapons, but advanced weapons systems (anti-aircraft, anti-tank systems, attack helicopters), on short notice (p. 23).”  

Consequently, one of the primary reasons why Liberia was declared a rogue state was its key role in the international arms trade, which facilitated Al Qaeda operatives, Israeli mercenaries, Hezbollah diamond merchants, Russian and Balkan organized crime figures and South African mercenaries. And since Mr. Taylor controlled the borders, his security apparatus were able to guarantee that even wanted criminals could enter and exit with impunity (Farah n.d., par. 5; Shelley 2005, 103). “Other connections Taylor developed included Leonid Minin, a Ukrainian-Israeli citizen who specialized in surplus weapons stock from Kiev; Aziz Nassour and Samih Osailly, Lebanese diamond merchants with connections with former Israeli military officers and Russian merchants; Balkans’ weapons trader, Slobodan Te_ic; and Iranian weapons dealer Ali Kleilat (CIJ 2005, 27)”

Although the UN has dropped all sanctions on Liberia, and including the delisting of all Liberians on travel ban and asset freeze, Mr. Urey remains on the U.S. Treasury Department’s list of Specially Designated individuals with whom it is illegal for citizens, residents aliens, and companies in the United States to conduct business. One key question that looms on the minds of U.S. Justice Officials, is the level of threat posed by pro-Taylor elements? According to a former Chief Prosecutor of The Hague, Stephen Rapp, now serving as President Obama War Crimes Czar, pro-Taylor forces still have the ability to organize themselves. For instance, an NPP rally in December 2008 and the recent launching of Ben Urey’s All Liberian Party has both able attract sizable gathering (see Vol. 2, Telegraph, 2011/11/02).

Before her departure from Liberia, Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield said this, “The peace in Liberia remains fragile, and its only guarantee is the robust and adaptable UNMIL presence. The GOL does not have the ability to quell violence, monitor its borders or operate independently to fight crime. A government closer to Taylor could tip the balance in the wrong direction.”

Reference

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